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With a 2012 deadline, the majority of the World Health Organization (WHO) member 
states failed to achieve the legal obligations mandated under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) of 2005. This lack of compliance coincides with the increased 
recognition of the threats posed by pandemics and infectious diseases. As the largest 
contributor of foreign global health assistance, the United States can serve an 
instrumental role in supporting global IHR compliance.  
This thesis analyzes, by U.S. government agency, which current global health 
programs and efforts align to the core capacities WHO member states are required to 
develop per the IHR. The agencies analyzed are the United States Agency for 
International Development, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. As indicated in this thesis, all three agencies have cross-cutting 
efforts to assist WHO member states; however, four key programs align greatly to 
specific IHR core capacities. Moving forward, decision makers can utilize these key U.S. 
global health programs to address WHO member states’ core capacity deficiencies in 
surveillance, response, laboratory, and human resources. Finally, recommendations are 
given to address IHR monitoring and reporting, as well as gaps in critical core capacities 
and U.S. global health programs. 
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Since 15 June 2007, the world has been implementing the International 
Health Regulations (IHR)(2005). This legally binding agreement 
significantly contributes to global public health security by providing a 
new framework for the coordination of the management of events that 
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, and 
will improve the capacity of all countries to detect, assess, notify and 
respond to public health threats.1  
A. MAKING A CASE 
Following the death of 932 individuals and the increasing Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa, on August 8, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC).2 To date, only three PHEIC have 
ever been issued, which includes the 2013–2014 Ebola outbreak. As a mechanism of the 
International Health Regulations (IHR), the PHEIC exists to warn other states of an 
international public health risk and to enable a coordinated international response.3 As 
evident with PHEIC notification, the West African nations of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea lack the appropriate resources and infrastructure to address the threat from Ebola: 
a virulent disease with a nearly 90 percent rate of fatality, which results from internal and 
external bleeding.4  
All three of the afflicted countries failed to meet the 15 June 2012 deadline to 
attain the minimum core capacity requirements mandated by IHR.5 They have also failed 
                                                 
1 World Health Organization, “About IHR,” Alert, Response, and Capacity Building Under the 
International Health Regulations (IHR), accessed August 19, 2014, http://www.who.int/ihr/about/en/. 
2 World Health Organization, “WHO Statement on the Meeting of the International Health Regulations 
Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa,” August 8, 2014, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.  
3 World Health Organization, “IHR Procedures Concerning Public Health Emergencies of 
International Concern (PHEIC),” Alert, Response, and Capacity Building Under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR), accessed August 18, 2014, http://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/. 
4 World Health Organization, “Ebola Virus Disease,” Fact Sheet N°103, Media Centre, last modified 
April 2014, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/. 
5 Regional Committee for Africa, “Implementation of International Health Regulations (2005) in the 
African Region,” Document AFR/RC62/12, World Health Organization, November 21, 2012, 
http://www.afro.who.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=8188&Itemid=2593. 
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even to monitor IHR compliance standards.6 This internal state failure threatens the 
greater global health security and the 2013–2014 Ebola outbreak demonstrates this fact. 
Furthermore, the outbreak has impacted the international community militarily and 
economically. For example, fear of the spreading the disease delayed the rotation of 
African Union peacekeeping forces to Somalia. In addition, Lebanon suspended the work 
visas of individuals from Ebola-stricken countries, and airliners have canceled flights 
emanating from the region. The initial response plan from WHO will cost $100 million 
from the international community.7 Recognizing no borders, infectious diseases pose a 
global health and national security threat. 
The IHR, a legally binding international agreement to prevent and respond to the 
spread of disease, presents the only legally mandated international approach toward 
mitigating this threat. While the United States contributes greatly to a set of global health 
programs, the preponderance of WHO member states are failing to meet their obligations 
under IHR. This thesis provides an analysis of the U.S. global health programs by agency 
to identify which current programs can best assist WHO member states meet the 
minimum IHR core capacities.  
B. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
According to the National Intelligence Council, infectious diseases pose a direct 
threat to the U.S. civilian population and U.S. military force readiness, and it can 
adversely affect national interests abroad.8 Infectious diseases still contribute to 
approximately a quarter of all deaths worldwide, and the potential threat is increasing due 
to an increase in travel and trade, climate change, and population growth.9 While deaths 
                                                 
6 World Health Organization [WHO], “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring 
Framework: All Capacities Data by Country,” Global Health Observatory Data Repository, accessed 
August 3, 2014, http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.IHR00ALLN?lang=en. 
7 Adam Nossiter and Alan Cowell, “Ebola Virus Is Outpacing Efforts to Control It, World Health 
Body Warns,” New York Times, August 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/world/africa/african-
leaders-and-who-intensify-effort-to-combat-ebola-virus.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar. 
8 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Strategic Implications of Global Health, ICA 2008-10D, 
Intelligence Community Assessment, December 2008, 12, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/113592.pdf. 
9 Gary Cecchine and Melinda Moore, Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information 
Needs (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006), 5. 
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attributable to infectious disease within the United States have decreased in the decade 
from 2000 to 2010, an average of one new infectious disease still emerges in the world 
each year, and the potential for severe or widespread problems, even within the United 
States, is immeasurable.10 These emerging infectious disease (EID) outbreaks range from 
the West Nile virus, the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), to most recently, Ebola.11  
In 2003, SARS cost an estimated $30 billion–$100 billion in economic losses 
alone, while the entire budget of the WHO was roughly $2.2 billion the same year.12 New 
threats like antibacterial-resistant infections have resulted in at least 23,000 deaths with a 
cost of $55 billion in the United States annually.13 Furthermore, incidents like the 2001 
anthrax attack have highlighted the threat of bioterrorism and the requirement for 
detection and early response.  
C. UNDERSTANDING THE IHR 
Following this rising international health threat, the WHO member states revised 
the IHR to expand on the international mechanisms for disease surveillance. Currently, 
the IHR provides the only legally mandated international approach to mitigating the 
threat of epidemic, infectious disease, or other health-related catastrophe.14 The revised 
regulations went into effect on 15 June 2007 and required all 194 member states to have 
or to develop minimum core public health capacities for disease surveillance by 2012.15 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 7. 
11 World Health Organization, “United States of America,” Global Alert and Response (GAR), 
accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/country/usa/en/.  
12 “The U.S. Government & Global Emerging Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response,” The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, last modified October 22, 2014, http://kff.org/global-health-
policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-global-emerging-infectious-disease-preparedness-and-response/; 
World Health Organization, Programme Budget 2002–2003: Performance Assessment Report, 
PBPA/2003–2003 Coor. 1, April 4, 2005, http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/PBPA_0203/PBPA2002-
2003_Corr1-en.pdf. 
13 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States, 
2013 (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013), 5, 11, 
http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/threat-report-2013/pdf/ar-threats-2013-508.pdf. 
14 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005), 2nd ed. (Geneva: WHO Press, 
2008), 1, http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf?ua=1. 
15 Ibid. 
 4 
Each core capacity contains multiple components necessary to achieve compliance, to 
include a varying degree of capability for each component. There are a total of eight IHR 
core capacities: 
 National Legislation, Policy, and Financing 
 Preparedness 
 Coordination and National Focal Point (NFP) Communication 
 Risk communication 
 Surveillance 
 Human Resources 
 Response 
 Laboratory Services16  
In addition, there are four IHR potential hazards areas that must be measured and 
in compliance: zoonotic events, food safety, chemical events, and radiation emergencies. 
Finally, WHO member states must meet a set of general obligations at points of entry 
(POE) that address the IHR core capacities and potential hazards.17 While progress has 
been made, by 2012 most member states had still not met the minimum requirements. A 
total of 118 member states requested and received a two-year extension to try and meet 
the core capacity requirements by 2014. This total equates to 60 percent of all member 
states failing to reach the minimum requirements for compliance.18  
D. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM 
The 2010 National Security Strategy highlights global surveillance as a critical 
component of combating pandemics and infectious disease.19 This document also lists the 
                                                 
16 Department of Global Capacities Alert and Response, Activity Report 2012 (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2013), 4, http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/activity_report_2012/en/. 
17 World Health Organization, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework: Checklist and Indicators 
for Monitoring Progress in the Development of IHR Core Capacities in States Parties,” International 
Health Regulations (2005) (Geneva: WHO Press, April 2013), 12, 15, 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/84933/1/WHO_HSE_GCR_2013.2_eng.pdf. 
18 WHO, “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring Framework: All Capacities Data by 
Country.”  
19 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 39, 
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf. 
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activities needed to increase global surveillance that include enhancing international 
collaboration, strengthening multilateral institutions, and relying on U.S. overseas 
laboratories in order to improve global surveillance and early warning capabilities. 
Unfortunately, global disease surveillance—which should help identify potential health-
related threats—contains many gaps, leaving national security decision makers without 
important information. This surveillance gap emanates from the poor health infrastructure 
in other countries, which depends upon international efforts for its improvement. When 
WHO member states achieve the IHR guidelines, the overall global network of disease 
surveillance is improved. 
The United States supports WHO member states in meeting the IHR both directly 
and indirectly through global health programs. Congressional appropriations for global 
health programs have grown from $1.7 billion in FY2001 to $8.5 billion in FY2013.20 
Several federal government stakeholders are involved with the global health programs: 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of State (DOS), 
Defense Department (DOD), and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). These programs range from providing AIDS relief to operating 
global disease detection centers. Most notably, the CDC and DOD are the agencies 
directly involved with international capacity-building efforts for disease surveillance: 
through the CDC’s global disease detection and emergency response activities and the 
DOD’s Global Emerging Infections Surveillance Response System (GEIS).  
No country directly contributes more to the WHO than the United States.21 Thus, 
while it is hard to argue that the United States should be doing more financially to assist 
the WHO, the current programs can be scrutinized for their policy and practical 
effectiveness. Currently, several issues exist with the global health programs, and more 
specifically, how these programs assist the WHO member states in meeting the IHR 
guidelines. U.S. global health programs have “overemphasized defensive medical 
                                                 
20 Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, U.S. Global Health Assistance: Background and Issues for the 113th 
Congress, R43115 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1. 
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, World Health Organization: Reform Agenda Developed, 
but U.S. Actions to Monitor Progress Could be Enhanced, GAO-12-722, 2012, 1, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-722.  
 6 
countermeasures and treatment while underinvesting in prevention, strengthening of 
public health systems, and the surveillance and response capacities of developing 
countries.”22 These issues can be attributed to several factors: budget allocation, intra- 
and interagency coordination, strategic guidance, parallel programs, and constraints 
within the WHO member states.  
Moreover, the outcomes of global health programs can be difficult to both 
quantify and qualify. Assistance in capacity building within countries can skew data, as 
health conditions may appear worse due to better surveillance and reporting mechanisms, 
which results in the appearance of an increase in disease populations. Also, there may be 
inadequate data sets to evaluate progress, since there were no preexisting data. Some 
programs, such as the CDC’s Global Disease Detection and Emergency Response 
(GDDER) program, explicitly work to build host country capacity to meet the IHR 
guidelines; however, many of the other global health programs are disease-specific 
programs.  
While global disease surveillance has increasingly been tied to U.S. national 
security, few global health programs directly support core surveillance programs. In 
FY2008, only one-percent of all global health program expenditures were directed at core 
programs to build international capacity for disease surveillance and response.23 Disease-
specific programs identify surveillance and capacity building only as a single activity 
among many to prevent and control a specified disease.24 Therefore, a key difficulty lies 
in trying to ascertain if disease-specific programs effectively help countries in meeting 
the IHR guidelines. Perhaps more importantly, how can we identify which global health 
programs directly align to building IHR core capacities? 
The monitoring and evaluation of global health programs remains paramount to 
determining effectiveness. An important evaluation method would be to determine in 
                                                 
22 Harley Feldbaum, U.S. Global Health and Security Policy (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 2009), 2, 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090420_feldbaum_usglobalhealth.pdf. 
23 William J. Long, Pandemic and Peace: Public Health Cooperation in Zones of Conflict 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 86. 
24 Ibid. 
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what countries U.S. global health efforts are located, and have those WHO member states 
improved or achieved IHR core capability compliance. Also, are global health programs 
directed to the locations with the greatest capability gaps and at most risk for emerging 
infectious disease and pandemics? 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the assumption that WHO member states’ adherence to the IHR presents the 
most viable means of global disease surveillance and global health security, the main 
question guiding the present thesis research is: How can U.S. global health programs 
assist WHO member states meet the guidelines set forth by the IHR? The related aspects 
to this question include: What is the current policy for U.S. global health programs? 
Which global health programs currently build on WHO member state IHR core 
capacities? How can researchers or policymakers understand the efficacy of these 
programs? 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is broken down into three sections: U.S. global health policy 
and strategy, U.S. global health program challenges and issues, as well as WHO member 
states IHR compliance failures. Review of literature in these areas helped shape the thesis 
by gaining a greater understanding of the critiques of U.S. policy and programs and why 
WHO member state fail. The common theme of criticism asserts that the global health 
policy and programs: 
 lack an overarching structure or strategy 
 involve multiple agencies with parallel efforts 
 are appropriated in a manner to address single diseases or issues 
 are charity based, as opposed to investment based 
 do not build capacity, nor are sustainable 
As a result of the literature review, this thesis will take an alternate approach to 
instead highlight how to identify and leverage existing U.S. global health programs to 
support IHR compliance with partner states.  
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1. U.S. Global Health Policy and Strategy 
A review of the current U.S. policy and strategy provides a greater understanding 
of how global health programs relate and assist the IHR guidelines. The policy can be 
analyzed from the executive and legislative branches, as well as the agencies that carry 
out the policy. These agencies include the HHS, USAID, and DOD. 
The executive branch lays out the global health policy in the 2010 National 
Security Strategy and the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development.25 The 
presidential policy directive aligns development with national security and labels 
“development as a core pillar of American power.”26 In terms of health the policy 
directive relies upon the administration’s global health initiative (GHI) that seeks to 
improve specific health principles such as expanding disease treatment and improving 
maternal child health.27 The health principles are aimed at meeting health outcomes that 
range from supporting more than 6 million people in HIV/AIDS treatment to reducing 
maternal mortality by 30 percent.28  
The National Security Strategy also identifies the need to pursue a global health 
strategy as a moral and strategic need, and one that will be accomplished through the 
GHI. It lists countering biological threats and pandemics and infectious disease as 
separate items from the pursuit of a global health strategy. With regards to all three 
challenges the security strategy highlights the need to work with others and to strengthen 
multinational institutions for the achievement of security.29 For pandemics and infectious 
disease global surveillance depends on “U.S. overseas laboratories, relationships with 
host nation governments, and the willingness of states to share health data with 
nongovernmental and international organizations.”30  
                                                 
25 White House, National Security Strategy; White House, Presidential Policy Directive-6: US Global 
Development Policy, 2010, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-6.pdf.  
26 White House, Presidential Policy Directive-6. 
27 Ibid. 
28 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Global Health Initiative: Saving Lives and Promoting Security, 
May 30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/191821.pdf.  
29 White House, National Security Strategy, 24, 39, 49. 
30 Ibid, 49. 
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Government agencies have nested their global health strategy to the executive 
branch’s policy, such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS), who 
oversee the CDC among other HHS agencies. The HHS has developed a “Global Health 
Strategy” that sets forth a mission to create “a healthier and safer world.”31 This mission 
has three goals and 10 supporting objectives.32 Of these objectives, three list capacity-
building efforts to support the IHR: enhance global health surveillance, prevent infectious 
diseases and other health threats, and prepare for and respond to public health 
emergencies.33 
The USAID also released the Global Health Strategic Framework that provides a 
mission statement to support “partner countries in preventing and managing major health 
challenges of poor, underserved, and vulnerable people, leading to improved health 
outcome.”34 Rajiv Shah, the USAID Administrator, provides an introduction in the 
strategic framework that states, “To accelerate progress in global health, we need to build 
country-led health systems instead of donor-driven disease control programs.”35 The 
document emphasizes the means to achieve the mission by conducting bilateral and 
regional field missions, coordinating with host countries, and providing in-country donor 
coordination to focus on six core health priorities. These core principles align with the 
GHI set forth by Presidential Policy Directive for Global Development, as well as the 
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG).36  
The DOD has no overarching policy or strategy to guide global health activities, 
as stated from a report prepared by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Furthermore, 
global health efforts are not delegated or centralized to any single entity within DOD, 
                                                 
31 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Global Health Strategy of the US Department 
of Health and Human Service (Washington, DC: Office of Global Affairs, 2011), 13, 
http://www.globalhealth.gov/pdfs/Global%20Health%20Strategy.pdf. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 25–29.  
34 United States Agency for International Development [USAID], USAID Global Health Strategic 
Framework: Better Health for Development, FY2012–FY2016 (Washington, DC: USAID, 2012), 14, 
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1864/gh_framework2012.pdf.  
35 Ibid., i. 
36 Ibid., 12, 16, 24. 
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instead multiple components within the DOD carryout these efforts. 37 The document 
consolidates a total of 67 policy and guidance documents that relate to DOD global 
health-related activities.38 These DOD policy and guidance documents lead to three focus 
areas for global health efforts: force health protection and readiness, medical stability 
operations and partnership engagement, and threat reduction.39  
A Congressional Research Service report prepared by Nina Serafino provides a 
similar conclusion with regards to the DOD global health policies.40 She states that it is 
unclear which office has direct leadership over DOD global health policies, and there is 
no coordinating policy for the DOD programs. While some organizations within DOD 
have created their own policy, this has not led to an institutionalized policy.41 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation maps out the evolution of the U.S. global 
health policy in an analysis of the stated vision, goals, and the supporting programs. 
Through the evolution of policy, global health programs have been supported by the 
executive branch for reasons of national security, soft power influence, and humanitarian 
assistance. The authors for the foundation argue that there is no single overarching global 
health strategy or centralized hierarchal structure to execute the strategy. Instead, global 
health programs are generated on an ad hoc basis and carried out by the existing 
government bureaucracies. Many of these bureaucracies are primarily domestic agencies 
that are increasingly, due to the threat, becoming involved within the international 
community. With the rapid increase in global health spending in the last decade and the 
                                                 
37 Josh Michaud, Kellie Moss, and Jen Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy: The U.S. Department of 
Defense and Global Health (Menlo Park, CA: The Henry Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012), 26, 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8358.pdf.  
38 Ibid., 27. 
39 Ibid., 21-22 
40 Nina M. Serafino, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major 




decentralized nature of global health programs, U.S. agencies have consistently gone 
through reorganizations to adapt to single initiatives and funds allocation.42  
Henry Feldbaum, an author for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
echoes the sentiment shared with the Kaiser Foundation. He states, “There is at present 
no overall U.S. global health strategy, nor is there a coherent governmental 
organizational structure for managing U.S. investments in global health or responding to 
transnational health threats.”43 Feldbaum also argues that global health programs have 
inherently been tied to national security. National security concerns raised the profile for 
selective issues such as HIV/AIDS and avian flu. This security emphasis causes only 
selective issues to get both the policymakers’ interest and support, while the underlying 
prevention and response system is neglected.44  
2. U.S. Global Health Program Challenges and Issues 
Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, a specialist in global health for the Congressional Research 
Service, outlines the issues regarding U.S. global health assistance for the 113
th
 Congress. 
She highlights that the lack of a single appropriations bill for global health programs 
creates a barrier in accurately labeling global health activities. Such issues as water and 
sanitation development could be categorized as global health activities; therefore, 
conflicting data exists about the true extent of assistance.45 Also, multiple appropriation 
bills create duplicative health programs that are implemented by separate agencies. The 
alternative would be specified U.S. agencies or departments having responsibility for 
lines of effort.46 Salaam-Blyther states that due to the program-emphasized nature of 
funding, critics contend that health programs can run against the health efforts of host 
countries, thereby hampering country ownership.47 Multiple other challenges are arising 
                                                 
42 Julie E. Fischer, Eric Lief, Vidal Seegobin, and Jen Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy: Mapping the 
United States Government Engagement in Global Public Health (Menlo Park, CA: The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2009), 7–9, 17. 
43 Feldbaum, U.S. Global Health and Security Policy, 12. 
44 Ibid., 11. 
45 Salaam-Blyther, U.S. Global Health Assistance, 3–4. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
47 Ibid., 18. 
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as well. The rise of private donors funding requires an increase in program coordination 
to negate program overlap and to maintain country ownership as a strategy.48 In 2011, the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation spent more on global health assistance than any other 
country except the United States.49 Developing countries are also increasingly seeing a 
rise in non-communicable disease deaths, which could change the dynamics of global 
health.50 
Laurie Garret, an author for Foreign Affairs, argues that the challenges in global 
health emanate from donor programs that deviate from the local health infrastructure.51 
Current programs are narrow in scope to a particular disease—known as stovepiping—so 
that the programs reflect the interests of the donor, not the recipient.52 These stovepiped 
programs are largely uncoordinated with paralleling efforts, which lead to inefficiencies 
in human and financial resources. Large influxes of money can create adverse outcomes 
by stripping away local health care workers from the general health care system.53 As an 
example, Garrett highlights that in Haiti the prevalence of HIV dropped from six to three-
percent from 2002 to 2006, yet all other measures of health dropped during the same 
period.54 Also, she points out that aid is not matched to the resources available: the 
funding of treatment within a country may outstrip the actual resources available.55 
Garrett maintains that global health programs should seek sustainability for the day when 
outside donations cease and the local health infrastructure must operate on local 
resources. Furthermore, aid should focus on building in-country capacity to handle the 
myriad of health related problems.56  
                                                 
48 Ibid., 17. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 14. 
51 Laurie Garrett, “The Challenge of Global Health,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007): 38, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032209. 
52 Ibid., 22–23. 
53 Ibid., 34. 
54 Ibid., 23. 
55 Ibid., 38. 
56 Ibid. 
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In his book, Pandemics and Peace, William Long argues that U.S. health 
programs do not go far enough “to adequately engage the threat of infectious disease 
outbreaks…and to seize the potential opportunity for enduring international 
collaborations in public health.”57 Instead, he argues similar to the other critiques that the 
programs fund the treatment of a few specific diseases, as opposed to strengthening the 
overall health systems. He argues the goal for funding should be in investment and not 
charity.58 This fund misallocation arises due to the difficulty in demonstrating the 
quantifiable effects of capacity-building. Also, capacity-building takes time and the 
budget cycle makes it difficult to support long-term investments.59 Long also argues that 
U.S. funding mirrors the approach of the donor community, which focuses on near-term 
problems instead of sustainable solutions.60 Within government policy, Long believes 
policy may be changing. He gives the Obama administration credit for the GHI that will 
focus on transitioning from a program of emergency response to one emphasizing 
sustainable country programs.61  
InterAction, an alliance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provides a 
briefing book for members of Congress. In the publication for the 113
th 
Congress, Global 
Health: Investing in Our Future, the organization provides a series of recommendations 
for health system strengthening with regards to U.S. global health programs. It states that 
in 2009, the U.S. government included capacity-building as a core principle of the GHI 
with a six-year, $63 billion commitment.62 With this monetary commitment, the 
organization recommends Congress to maintain capacity-building within all future health 
related legislation. Congress should also encourage USAID to work toward a 
comprehensive strategy that articulates goals and desired outcomes, while defining and 
applying clear metrics to assess the impact of U.S. programs. The organization advocates 
                                                 
57 Long, Pandemic and Peace, 97. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid.,102. 
60 Ibid., 97. 
61 Ibid., 103 
62 InterAction, Global Health: Investing in Our Future (Washington, DC: InterAction, 2013), 59, 
http://www.globalhealth.org/wp-content/uploads/GlobalHealthBriefingBook_FINAL_web.pdf.  
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that the executive administration puts emphasis on the local populations buy-in for the 
direction of its health improving activities.63 
3. WHO Member States IHR Compliance Failure 
Most countries have not met IHR implementation, although gradual progress has 
been made. As of 2013, approximately 80 percent of WHO member states had still not 
met the criteria for the IHR.64 The IHR monitoring framework assesses the core 
capacities annually based on a checklist of 20 global indicators.65 While the revision of 
the IHR protocols by the member states of the World Health Assembly was ambitious, 
the modest implementation, thus far, is indicative of the poor health infrastructure in most 
countries.  
The authors Julie Fischer and Rebecca Katz admit that the shortfalls in IHR 
implementation are reflective of the task and not the lack of commitment from the health 
community.66 Furthermore, the economic climate has made it difficult for donors and 
developing states to invest in these core capacities. The authors argue that article 44 of 
the IHR “calls on state parties to provide technical cooperation and logistical support to 
facilitate implementation and to mobilize financial resources for capacity building,” yet 
no standing fund or technical assistance mechanize has been created.67 Most funding by 
donors has been provided by security funds, mostly by the DOD, and these funds are 
typically less sustainable.68 Ultimately, Fischer and Katz argue that IHR capacity-
building must become integrated into the health policy and strategy of “governments and 
their development partners.”69 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 59-61. 
64 Julie E. Fischer and Rebecca Katz, “Moving Forward to 2014: Global IHR (2005) Implementation,” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 11, no. 2 (2013): 153–156, 
doi:10.1089/bsp.2013.0030. 
65 World Health Organization [WHO], Summary of 2011 States Parties Report on IHR Core Capacity 
Implementation (Geneva: WHO Press, 2012), 4, 
http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHO_HSE_GCR_2012.10_eng.pdf. 
66 Fischer and Katz, “Moving Forward to 2014,” 153. 
67 Ibid., 154. 
68 Ibid., 156. 
69 Ibid. 
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Wilson, Brownstein, and Fidler provide a similar argument regarding the lack of a 
coordinated and funded global health initiative for IHR capacity-building assistance.70 
They also suggest that the IHR core capacities may distort national public health 
priorities by forcing countries to divert resources to meet the legally mandated 
regulation.71 Additionally, rising controversies emanating from possible IHR violations 
undermine the way forward in relying upon the IHR as the means to detect, assess, report, 
and respond to health threats. These possible violations include the withholding of 
biological samples and unnecessary travel and trade restrictions.72 
In 2010, a series of workshops were held in Washington, DC, and Geneva to 
discuss lessons learned and recommendations that help build core disease surveillance 
capacity under the IHR.73 Based on the highlights from the meeting, a few common 
themes emerged. The success of implementation depends upon direct support from the 
political level, not just the health sector. Also, it depends upon communication across 
intragovernmental agencies, in which, many states struggle. The more specific challenges 
were mentioned, as well. While states have been successful in building capacities at the 
national level, many lack progress at the local level. The lack of appropriate human 
resources continues to hamper gains, but regional training centers can improve the 
number of personnel trained. Also, cross-collaboration and intergovernmental 
cooperation is needed at multiple levels, since no single institution or country has all the 
necessary capacities and it maximizes resource investment.74 
The 2011 WHO summary of core capacity implementation provides insight on the 
areas most deficient within the international community, as well as regional differences. 
Globally, the area most deficient was human resources with only 44 percent of member 
                                                 
70 Kumanan Wilson, John S. Brownstein, and David P. Fidler, “Strengthening the International Health 
Regulations: Lessons from the H1N1 Pandemic,” Health and Policy Planning 25, no. 6 (2010): 506, 
doi:10.1093/heapol/czq026.  
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 507. 
73 Rebecca L. Katz, Jose A. Fernandez, and Scott J.N. Mcnabb, “Disease Surveillance, Capacity 
Building and Implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]),” BMC Public Health 
10, suppl. 1 (2010): S1, doi:10.1186/1471-2458-10-S1-S1. 
74 Ibid. 
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states meeting the minimum requirement.75 As a region, Africa consistently ranked at the 
bottom for all core capacities.76 The WHO report also summarizes the responses of 
member states in terms of the areas that they require support.77 As an example, one 
request is that all diagnostic laboratories be “certified or accredited to international 
standards or to national standards adapted from international standards.”78 Another 
requests help in assessing gaps in workforce resources and training.79 
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of the U.S. global health programs by 
their implementing agencies: USAID, DOD, and HHS/CDC. For each implementing 
agency, the analysis will focus on whether or not its global health activities relate to or 
support the IHR core capacities, as well as identifying the supporting policy. More 
importantly, the analysis will examine which core capacity each global health activity 
aligns. 
The sources required for this level of comparison and analysis will greatly rely on 
government and international organization documents on the global health programs. 
This comparative analysis may have some specific limitations. Many health programs 
have multiple implementing agencies—for example, the president’s emergency plan for 
AIDS relief (PEPFAR). In these cases, the specific activities of each agency will be 
examined. Some health programs are funded by agencies other than the executor; in these 
situations the program will correspond to the executing agent. Also, while the inputs may 
be easy to calculate, the outputs may be difficult both to quantify and to qualify. It may 
be hard to defer an actual outcome of a program, but perhaps this will highlight the need 
for more oversight or metrics for success. Another limitation is that the alignment of a 
health activity to a core capacity may appear to be subjective. The thesis will attempt to 
highlight the research or subjective limitations. 
                                                 
75 WHO, Summary of 2011 States Parties Report, 8. 
76 Ibid, 9. 
77 Ibid., 61–62. 
78 Ibid., 62. 
79 Ibid. 
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The chapters of this thesis are broken down by governmental agency. Chapter II 
examines the work of the USAID global health programs and measure each health 
activity’s measure of performance based on the methodology previously mentioned. 
Chapter III takes a similar approach to Chapter II, while examining the CDC global 
health programs, most notably from the Center of Global Health. Chapter IV examines 
the work of DOD and analyzes its contributions to the IHR core capacities. Finally, 
Chapter V provides a summary of the findings from the comparative analysis and draws a 
conclusion on how the U.S. can best assist partner countries meet IHR compliance. In 
addition, Chapter V will identify the gaps in the research, avenues for further research, 
and policy implications. 
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II. USAID GLOBAL HEALTH PROGRAMS 
Founded in 1961, USAID remains committed to improving global health. 
Congress controls the means of foreign assistance through direct budget appropriations 
for specified health technical areas. USAID implements these health efforts through the 
Bureau of Global Health. The stated mission for the global health mission is to support 
“partner countries in preventing and managing major health challenges of poor, 
underserved, and vulnerable people, leading to improved health outcomes.”80 Activities 
aligned to promote disease surveillance, or that parallel IHR core capacities, are 
diminutive compared to other global health developmental goals.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The focus and methods employed by USAID have changed over the decades. In 
the first decade of its existence, the organization worked to improve sanitation, eradicate 
smallpox, and implement measles control through direct loans and grants.81 The 
eradication of smallpox by the 1980s demonstrated the efficacy of global health measures 
and served as an example for other disease vaccination programs.82 In the 1970s, USAID 
sought to increase development through meeting the basic needs of the poor in four 
functional areas: primary health care, water and sanitation, disease control programs, and 
health planning. Congress also passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, which gave 
Congress greater control and oversight over foreign assistance.83 By the 1980s, USAID 
launched the Demographic and Health Surveys program that provides the gold standard 
for country-specific health related data.84 Other initiatives of the decade included the 
                                                 
80 USAID, USAID Global Health Strategic Framework, 3.  
81 Tonya Himelfarb, 50 Years of Global Health: Saving Lives and Building Futures, United States 
Agency for International Development (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International 
Development, 2014), 20-21, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1864/USAID_50-Years-
of-Global-Health.pdf. 
82 Ibid., 23. 
83 Ibid., 26—7. 
84 Ibid., 59. 
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Child Survival Initiative, the Polio Eradication Initiative, and the HIV/AIDS program 
following the emergence of the epidemic in 1981.85  
In the 1990s, USAID began to leverage NGOs and the private sector amid budget 
cuts, which led to a 30 percent reduction of foreign- and civil-service employees.86 New 
and reemerging threats still loomed such as a resurgence of malaria, the identification 
antimicrobial-resistant microorganisms, and tuberculosis. With the terrorists’ events of 
September 11, 2001, a new paradigm of defense, diplomacy, and development emerged. 
USAID became heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the new pandemic 
influenza and other emerging threats (PIOET) program launched in 2005 addressed the 
rising health security concerns of possible pandemics. 
Such other programs as PEPFAR, the Global Fund, and the president’s Malaria 
initiative began during the decade, which further aligned funds against specified diseases 
by Congress. PEPFAR became the greatest investment in history by a single donor to 
combat a single disease.87 The greater focus on particular diseases may be a result of the 
2000 National Intelligence Estimate: The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its 
Implications for the United States, which addressed possible security concerns arising 
from the effects of disease in the developing world.88 By the 2000s, there was also a 
greater interdependence occurring among U.S. agencies, NGOs, and international 
organizations to carryout programs and initiatives with partner countries. In 2002, 
USAID established the Bureau for Global Health (GH) signifying the significant increase 
in health efforts within developmental aid. 
With a change of presidential administrations, President Obama announced the 
GHI in 2009. The GHI contains health targets associated with the already existent 
USAID funded programs; however, the initiative calls for interagency teams to build 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 49. 
86 Ibid., 62. 
87 Ibid., 74. 
88 U.S. National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: The Global Infectious Disease 
Threat and Its Implications for the United States, NIE 99-17D (Washington, DC: U.S. National Intelligence 
Council, 2000), 5, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/infectiousdiseases_2000.pdf.  
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country strategies in conjunction with host country national health plans.89 Moving 
forward, USAID provided a global health strategic framework for FY2012–2016 that 
sought to incorporate the USAID policy, UN Millennium Development Goals, and GHI 
with program implementation.90 The strategy purports five priorities: “saving mothers 
and children, fostering an AIDS-free generation, combating infectious diseases, 
increasing the availability and use of voluntary family planning, and strengthening health 
systems.”91 The prioritization of combating infectious diseases most aligns with the IHR 
core capacities.  
B. ORGANIZATION 
Figure 1 provides the organizational chart for USAID’s GH.  
                                                 
89 U.S. Department of State, The U.S. Global Health Initiative. 
90 USAID, USAID Global Health Strategic Framework, 12–13, 26.  
91 Ibid., 3.  
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Figure 1.  USAID: Global Health Organizational Chart92 
The GH within USAID manages health projects, provides “technical support to 
USAID missions and field programs,” and works with the broader international 
community to advance USAID and partner countries’ priorities and initiatives.93 The 
Office of the Assistant Administrator (AA) provides oversight over the seven other 
offices under the GH. Three of these offices serve as technical offices: Office of Health, 
Infectious Diseases and Nutrition (HIDN), Office of Population and Reproductive Health 
(PRH), and Office of HIV/AIDS (OHA). The other offices under AA serve as support.94  
The technical offices provide technical and programmatic direction and 
leadership, as well as support field programs within their corresponding technical area.95 
                                                 
92 United States Agency for International Development [USAID], Users Guide to USAID/Washington 
Health Programs, FY2014 (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014), 
2–6, http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/home/Resources/users_guide.html. 
93 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 2. 
94 Ibid., 2–6. 
95 Barbara O’Hanlon, USAID’s Funding Decisions on Reproductive Health and Family Planning 
(Washington, DC: O’Hanlon Health Consulting LLC., 2009), 14, 
http://www.hewlett.org/uploads/files/USAID_FPRH_Funding_Decisions_-_OHanlon_April_2009.pdf. 
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While each office is involved in the budget process, all requests must go through various 
budget submissions and justifications: bureau program and budget submission, agency 
budget submission, joint USAID-State budget, president’s budget, congressional budget 
justification, and the 653(a) report of the Foreign Assistance Act.96 The PRH and OHA 
support global health activities that directly correspond to a congressional supported 
global health program. For example, PRH directly aligns with Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Global Health Program; however, the HIDN overseas multiple 
divisions with various global health budgets approved by Congress (see Figure 1 and 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1.   USAID Global Health Program Funding97 
C. METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSIS 
Through a review of the FY2014 USAID health project listings by office, each 
project will be evaluated based on its relationship to an IHR core capacity. Each IHR core 
capacity contains key components that must be met for compliance: the WHO’s IHR 
Core Capacity Monitoring Framework: Checklist and Indicators for Monitoring 
Progress in the Development of IHR Core Capacities in States Parties provides the 
recommended checklist for these key components.98 While most USAID programs do not 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 22–23. 
97 USAID, USAID Global Health Strategic Framework, 13. 
98 WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26–55.  
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purport to assure IHR compliance, an analysis of each project within each global health 
technical program and division can reveal cross-cutting efforts to exploit. Figure 2 




Figure 2.  Methodology for Analysis Example99 
                                                 
99 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 45; WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 39. 
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D. LIMITATIONS 
A review of all FY2014 USAID global health projects was conducted. From the 
review, a comprehensive list was organized for which projects relate or build upon IHR 
core capacities; however, the analysis was centered off the narrative provided by each 
project listing. This narrative may differ from actual actions taking place during project 
implementation. Furthermore, projects that provided funding and support to large 
international organizations were generally omitted, as the narratives were too flexible in 
scope to categorize core capacities to be impacted: examples include the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) umbrella grant and the UN 
Children’s Fund MCH umbrella grant. 
E. PROGRAMS, FUNDING, AND ANALYSIS 
As an agency, USAID’s spending decreased when evaluated as a percentage of 
GDP from 1962 to 2012. In 1962, the budget for USAID was $4.5 billion with a national 
GDP of $605.1 billion, amounting to expenditures of .7 percent of GDP. In 2012, 
USAID’s budget was $14.6 billion with a national GDP of $16.244 trillion, an 
expenditure of only .09 percent of GDP.100 Conversely, health expenditures have become 
the greatest sector of spending for USAID, contributing to 31.2 percent of all spending in 
FY2012.101 Based on the FY2014 budget request, global health programs are aligned 
under three lines of effort that support the GHI: saving lives of mothers and children, 
creating an AIDS-free generation, and protecting communities from other infectious 
diseases.102  
                                                 
100 Himelfarb, 50 Years of Global Health, 12; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Table 1.1.5. Gross 
Domestic Product,” U.S. Department of Commerce, accessed July 24, 2014, 
http://bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=9&step=1#reqid=9&step=1&isuri=1. 
101 “U.S. Agency for International Development,” Foreign Assistance by Agency, last modified June 
30, 2014, http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/AgencyLanding.aspx. 
102 U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 and Other International 
Programs, Fiscal Year 2014 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 70–76, 
http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/207305.pdf. 
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1. Saving Lives of Mothers and Children 
The health programs that support efforts to end preventable child and maternal 
deaths constitute the greatest proportion of spending by USAID. The programs amount to 
a total of $1,992 million of requested budget for FY2014, while the remainder of the 
USAID budget amounts to $653 million.103 With estimated three-quarters of all child and 
maternal deaths preventable, the USAID’s goal is to “reduce maternal mortality by 30 
percent” and “under-five child mortality by 35 percent across assisted countries.”104 
Seemingly, maternal and child health would have little overlap with IHR, however, 
opportunities exist for a cross-cutting approach to achieve both USAID’s objectives and 
support IHR compliance.  
A total of five global health programs exist that support the global health strategic 
priority for saving lives of mothers and children (see Table 1): maternal and child health, 
malaria, family planning and reproductive health, nutrition, and vulnerable children. 
Table 1 provides the budget for each supporting activity. An analysis of USAID global 
health programs, seen in Table 2, reveals that family planning and reproductive health, 
maternal child health, and malaria global health activities can assist with the development 
of IHR core capacities. These programs operate under the organizational control of PRH 
and HIDN. No cross-cutting areas could be identified with the global health programs 
and budget for nutrition and vulnerable children.  
                                                 
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid., 71; USAID, USAID Global Health Strategic Framework, 13.  
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Table 2.   Saving Lives of Mothers and Children Global Health Project: Analysis105 
                                                 
105 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 21, 22, 24, 29, 45, 107-08, 117, 119; WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26–55. 
Agreement Number Agreement Title Office/Division Location Related IHR Core Capacity Related IHR Core Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity Related Goals and Objectives
AAG-G-00-97-00019
Health and Emergency Response Support: (WHO: 
Polio, Immunizations, CS, ID) HIDN/MCH Worldwide Surveillance Preparedness
*Improve disease surveillance 
*Support logistical planning at the district and national level
GPO-A-00-09-00006 CapacityPlus PRH/SDI Worldwide Human Resources
*Strengthen "the human resource systems necessary to 
develop, maintain and support the workforce"
Multiple Transform PRH/PEC Worldwide Risk Communication
*Strengthen the quality of existing health  communication 
activities through creative communication campaigns
OAA-A-10-00067 Health Policy Project PRH/PEC Worldwide Human Resources National Legislation
*Strengthen partner country undergraduate, graduate, and 
professional development programs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
*Strengthen "in-country capacity for policy and governance, 
financing, leadership"
OAA-A-12-00031 Health and Immunization Response Support HIDN/MCH Worldwide Response Surveillance Risk Communication
*Training for emergency outbreak response
*Support community detection and reporting strategies
*Information campaigns, community mobilization  
OAA-A-12-00058 Health Communication Capacity Collaborative PRH/PEC Worldwide Risk Communication Human resources
*Strengthen "in-country capacity to implement state-of-the-art 
health communication"
OAA-A-12-00057 MalariaCare HIDN/MAL Worldwide Response Laboratory
*"Strengthen lab capacity for malaria and other infectious 
diseases"
*Increase capacity for case management of malaria and other 
childhood diseases
OAA-TO-11-00012 DELIVER Malaria Task Order 7 HIDN/MAL Worldwide Response Preparedness
*Strengthen in-country supply systems and increase the 
capacity for case management
OAA-TO-10-00064 DELIVER Project (Deliver II) Task Order 4 PRH/CSL Worldwide Preparedness
*"Improve and strengthen in-country supply chains...to ensure 
that in-country supply chains are able to meet the basic health 
commodity requirements of public health programs"
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2. Creating an AIDS-free Generation 
USAID efforts in creating an AIDS-free generation mainly go in support of the 
larger PEPFAR program. PEPFAR is the largest single-disease effort undertaken by a 
nation, and the largest source of funding emanates from the global health programs. The 
funds from the global health programs are divided between DOS and USAID activities. 
USAID contributions to HIV/AIDS are set to equal $330 million in FY2014.106 In 
supporting PEPFAR, USAID hopes to “support the prevention of more than 12 million 
new HIV infections, provide direct support to more than six million people on treatment, 
and support care for more than 12 million people, including five million orphans and 
children.”107  
An analysis of USAID projects under OHA reveal only two projects with an 
ability to support IHR core capacities (see Table 3). The U.S. Census Bureau 
participating agency program agreement aligns with the IHR core capacity for 
surveillance by increasing “surveillance data on epidemic prone and priority diseases,” as 
well as “baseline estimates, trends, and thresholds for alert and action.”108 The partner 
countries would have to leverage the data and technical knowledge gained through the 
program to increase or meet IHR compliance. Supply chain management increases 
preparedness by enabling partner countries to “plan for management and distribution of 






                                                 
106 U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, 73–75. 
107 USAID, USAID Global Health Strategic Framework, 13. 
108 WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 30. 





Table 3.   Creating an AIDS-free Generation Global Health Project: 
Analysis110 
3. Protecting Communities from Other Infectious Diseases 
USAID combats infectious disease largely through three programs, which each 
have their lines of funding: tuberculosis, neglected tropical diseases, and the PIOET 
program.111 The total funding allotted to combating infectious diseases amounts to $323 
million for FY2014. This amounts to 12 percent of the USAID global health budget.112 
These programs all operate under the HIDN and support the health targets set forth by the 
President Obama administration’s GHI:  
 Contribute to the treatment of a minimum of 2.6 million new sputum 
smear-positive tuberculosis cases and 57,200 multidrug-resistant cases of 
TB.  
 Contribute to a 50 percent reduction in TB deaths and disease burden 
relative to the 1990 baseline.  
 Reduce the prevalence of seven neglected tropical diseases, contributing to 
the global elimination of lymphatic filariasis, blinding trachoma, leprosy, 
and onchocerciasis in Latin America.113 
Reasonably, USAID’s effort to combat infectious diseases would most parallel 
the functions and goals of the IHR. Analysis of the USAID projects reveals this to be 
evident. Out of the projects that combat infectious disease, the PIOET program contains 
                                                 
110 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 58-59.; WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26-
55. 
111 U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, 75-76. 
112 “Budget Tracker: Status of U.S. FY14 Funding for Key Global Health Related Accounts,” The 
Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, last modified February 28, 2014, 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/8045_fy2014.pdf. 
113 USAID, USAID Global Health Strategic Framework, 13. 
Agreement Number Agreement Title Office/Division Location
Related IHR Core 
Capacity Related Goals and Objectives
GHA-T-00-08-00002
U.S. Census Bureau Participating 
Agency Program Agreement OHA/SPER Worldwide Surveillance
*Build, model, advise, and provide technical 
support for HIV/AIDS Surveillance Data Base
GPO-I-03-05-00032
Supply Chain Management 
System OHA/SCH Worldwide Preparedness
*"Promote sustainable supply chains in 
partner countries"
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half of the projects that support or could support IHR core capacities. Efforts to combat 
tuberculosis amount to a third of the projects under HIDN (see Table 4). Each PIOET 
program project generally contains more related IHR core capacities; for example, for 




Table 4.   Infectious Disease Global Health Project: Analysis114 
                                                 
114 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 93, 99–100, 102–3, 133–9; WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26–55. 
Agreement Number Agreement Title Office/Division Location
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity Related Goals and Objectives
AAG-P-00-01-00001
International Broadcasting 
Bureau/ Voice of America HIDN Worldwide Risk Communication
*Support public health reporting and 
programming
GHA-G-00-09-00003 IDENTIFY HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Response Laboratory Risk Communication Preparedness
IHR Hazard: Zoonotic 
Events
*Support outbreak response
*Improve laboratory security and safety
*Increase information collaboration 
between animal and human public 
health systems
*Increase pandemic preparedness
GHN-A-00-09-00002 PREVENT HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Risk Communication
*Enhance public communication at the 
national level
*Increase awareness 
GHN-A-00-09-00010 PREDICT HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Surveillance Preparedness
NFP Communications 
and Coordination
IHR Hazard: Zoonotic 
Events
*Develop risk models for zoonotic 
diseases
*"Establish a global early warning 
system for zoonotic disease"
*Increase information and knowledge 
of surveillance activities
GHN-A-00-09-00015 RESPOND HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Human Resources
*Strengthen human capacity through 
training programs and institution 
collaboration
GHN-I-01-09-0006 TB Task Order 2015 HIDN Worldwide Surveillance Laboratory Response Risk Communication
*Strengthen laboratory networks and 
diagnostic tools
*Enhance "advocacy, communication, 
and social mobilization"
*Support TB detection and control
GHN-T-00-06-00001 CDC Interagency Agreement II HIDN Worldwide
NFP Communications 
and Coordination National Legislation
*Provide technical and program 
support to develop global, regional, 
and country programs with regards to 
infectious diseases




Quantity Contract HIDN Worldwide Surveillance Laboratory Response Risk Communication *Increase TB control strategies
OAA-A-10-00020 TB Care - I HIDN/ID Worldwide Surveillance Laboratory Response Risk Communication
*Improve laboratory capacity
*Strengthen TB control strategy
OAA-A-10-00021 TB Care - II HIDN/ID Worldwide Surveillance Laboratory Response Risk Communication
*Improve laboratory capacity
*Strengthen TB control strategy
OAA-TO-11-00015
DELIVER - Emerging Pandemic 
Threats Task Order 6 HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Laboratory Preparedness
*Build laboratory capacity
*Build logistic capacity and commodity 
security
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4. Other USAID Efforts 
The USAID global health projects listed in Table 5 are managed by OHS, a 
support office under GH, and the Africa Bureau. Most of the global health projects 
managed by the Africa Bureau still align to one of the lines of effort organized under GH: 
save the lives of mothers and children, create AIDS-free generation, and combat 
infectious disease. The projects under OHS leverage the office’s focus on strengthening 
health systems and improving health outcomes.115 When analyzed in relation to the IHR 
core capacities, these USAID efforts include at least one activity in all eight core 
capacities (see Table 5). 
 
                                                 
115 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 2. 
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Table 5.   USAID Global Health Projects Under Bureaus or Offices Other than HIDN, OHA, and PRH: Analysis.116  
 
                                                 
116 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 14–15, 143, 145, 154–55, 157-58; WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26–55. 
Agreement Number Agreement Title Bureau/Office/Division Location
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity Related Goals and Objectives
690-0020 Human Resources Alliance for Africa Africa Southern Location Human Resources
*Faciliate and assist with HR policy 
and planning
674-A-00-10-00060-00
Building Local Capacity for Delivery of 
HIV Services in Southern Africa Africa Southern Africa Preparedness
*Strengthen delivery of health 
services by regional health 
facilities
AFR-G-00-07-00003
WHO/Africa Regional Office: Support for 
the Eradication of Polio Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Surveillance Laboratory Risk Communication
*Improve laboratory performance
*Support surveillance efforts
*Support communication and 
social mobilization efforts
AFR-G-00-10-00002
WHO/Africa Regional Office: Support for 
Disease Control and Reproductive 
Health in Africa Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Response
*Through Inter-country Support 
Teams, "provide rapid responses 
to countries in epidemic and 
emergency"
GHA-A-00-08-00003 MEASURE Evaluation Phase III Bureau wide Worldwide
NFP Communications 
and Coordination
*Increase the communication and 
coordination within the health 
sector
OAA-A-11-00021
Systems for Improved Access to 
Pharmaceuticals and Services OHS Worldwide Preparedness
*Strengthen supply chains and the 
pharmaceutical services
OAA-A-12-00080 Health Finance and Governance Project OHS Worldwide National Legislation
*Provide assistance to improve 
finance and governance systems 
within the health sector
OAA-C-13-00095
The Demographic and Health Surveys 
Program Bureau-wide Worldwide Surveillance
*Provide assistance for health 
surveys
*Increase capacity for data 
collection and analysis  
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F. HOW TO USE THE DATA 
The analysis conducted between ongoing USAID projects and the IHR core 
capacities is not a critique USAID’s mission or goals, but instead a way to identify or 
leverage the supplemental benefits of USAID’s projects and global health programs. 
Table 6 provides a consolidated list of these projects. The analysis also reveals the 
projects with relevancy to IHR, as well as the divisions operating under GH that can 
assist with IHR compliance.  
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Table 6.   USAID Project Listing with IHR Compatibility117  
USAID can also use IHR compliance to identify critical weaknesses or strengths 
in partnering countries. As part of the GHI, individual country strategies should be built 
to increase compliance of the IHR and leverage preexisting projects that could increase 
                                                 
117 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 10-162; WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26-
55. 
Agreement Number Agreement Title Bureau/Office Location
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
Related IHR Core 
Capacity
AAG-G-00-97-00019
Health and Emergency Response Support: 
(WHO: Polio, Immunizations, CS, ID) HIDN/MCH Worldwide Surveillance Preparedness
GPO-A-00-09-00006 CapacityPlus PRH/SDI Worldwide Human Resources
Multiple Transform PRH/PEC Worldwide
Risk 
Communication




Health and Immunization Response 








OAA-A-12-00057 MalariaCare HIDN/MAL Worldwide Response Laboratory
OAA-TO-11-00012 DELIVER Malaria Task Order 7 HIDN/MAL Worldwide Response Preparedness
OAA-TO-10-00064 DELIVER Project (Deliver II) Task Order 4 PRH/CSL Worldwide Preparedness
GHA-T-00-08-00002
U.S. Census Bureau Participating Agency 
Program Agreement OHA/SPER Worldwide Surveillance
GPO-I-03-05-00032 Supply Chain Management System OHA/SCH Worldwide Preparedness
AAG-P-00-01-00001






(Aligns w/ IHR Hazard: Zoonotic Events) HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Response Laboratory
Risk 
Communication Preparedness









GHN-A-00-09-00015 RESPOND HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Human Resources
GHN-I-01-09-0006 TB Task Order 2015 HIDN Worldwide Surveillance Laboratory Response
Risk 
Communication






Multiple Tuberculosis Indefinite Quantity Contract HIDN Worldwide Surveillance Laboratory Response
Risk 
Communication
OAA-A-10-00020 TB Care - I HIDN/ID Worldwide Surveillance Laboratory Response
Risk 
Communication




DELIVER - Emerging Pandemic Threats Task 
Order 6 HIDN/PIOET Worldwide Laboratory Preparedness
690-0020 Human Resources Alliance for Africa Africa Southern Location Human Resources
674-A-00-10-00060-00
Building Local Capacity for Delivery of HIV 
Services in Southern Africa Africa Southern Africa Preparedness
AFR-G-00-07-00003
WHO/Africa Regional Office: Support for 




WHO/Africa Regional Office: Support for 
Disease Control and Reproductive Health in 
Africa Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Response





Systems for Improved Access to 
Pharmaceuticals and Services OHS Worldwide Preparedness




The Demographic and Health Surveys 
Program Bureau-wide Worldwide Surveillance
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deficient core capacities. Aid assistance could also be a stipulation for IHR compliance 
monitoring, as a total of eight countries receiving USAID global health aid have not 
reported compliance attribute scores to WHO in 2013.118  
Further analysis as seen in Table 7 demonstrates a positive relationship between 
USAID aid and average IHR attribute score in Africa. In terms of IHR reporting in 
Africa, 29.7 percent of countries have provided no data for IHR compliance. Excluding 
the non-reporting countries, USAID global health aid recipients in Africa average a core 
capacity attribute score of 60.76 percent in IHR compliance, while countries that receive 
no USAID global health aid average only 47.53 percent.119 These numbers do not prove 
causation, but could provide an impetus to measure progress based upon international 
standards to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the 
international spread of disease.  
                                                 
118 WHO, “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring Framework: All Capacities Data by 
Country;” U.S. Department of State, Executive Budget Summary, 154–55. 




Table 7.   Africa Region IHR Compliance and USAID Aid120  
 
                                                 
120 WHO, “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring Framework: All Capacities Data by 






USAID FY2014 GHP 
Country Budget ($ 
in thousands)
Africa Algeria 47.11111111
Africa Angola 48.55555556 38,700
Africa Benin No Data 23,500
Africa Botswana 36.55555556
Africa Burkina Faso 63.33333333 9,000
Africa Burundi 45.11111111 16,500
Africa Cabo Verde No Data
Africa Cameroon 89.66666667 1,500




Africa C?te d'Ivoire 88.66666667
Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo 64 122,700
Africa Equatorial Guinea 36
Africa Eritrea 66.22222222
Africa Ethiopia No Data 135,900
Africa Gabon No Data
Africa Gambia 58.88888889
Africa Ghana 65.11111111 61,500
Africa Guinea No Data 15,500
Africa Guinea-Bissau No Data
Africa Kenya 70.55555556 81,400
Africa Lesotho 68.22222222 6,400
Africa Liberia No Data 30,700
Africa Madagascar 32.55555556 49,000
Africa Malawi No Data 72,400
Africa Mali No Data 56,850
Africa Mauritania No Data
Africa Mauritius 53
Africa Mozambique 60.11111111 68,100
Africa Nambia No Data
Africa Niger 67.55555556
Africa Nigeria 47.55555556 169,200
Africa Rwanda 41.33333333 43,000
Africa Sao Tome and Principe 20.44444444
Africa Sengal No Data 55,400
Africa Seychelles 52.55555556
Africa Sierra Leon No Data
Africa South Africa 72.44444444 10,000
Africa South Sudan 62.44444444 35,510
Africa Swaziland 44 6,900
Africa Togo 55.88888889
Africa Uganda 76.66666667 86,100 IHR non-reporting state that receives USAID GH-aid
Africa United Republic of Tanzania 50.22222222 97,135 IHR non-reporting state that receives no USAID GH-aid
Africa Zambia 91.77777778 56,875 IHR reporting state that receives no USAID GH-aid
Africa Zimbabwe No Data 40,500 IHR reporting state that receives USAID GH-aid
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III. DOD GLOBAL HEALTH PROGRAMS 
As U.S. military personnel are deployed in over 160 countries and have the 
possibility to be deployed in many more, the DOD has an interest in global health 
efforts.121 These global health efforts increase the force health protection for U.S. 
military personnel, so that they may operate in areas with endemic diseases. The global 
health efforts also can have ancillary health benefits to the populations for where U.S. 
forces are stationed and can add to the wealth of knowledge on particular diseases. 
Furthermore, the expanding role of stability operations for the U.S. military has increased 
the number of medical engagements with partnering states. These activities can build 
goodwill, as well as provide stability to local governance. As evident with the analysis of 
DOD global health programs in this chapter, the programs can serve to increase IHR 
compliance globally. 
A. BACKGROUND 
DOD has a vested interest in combating infectious diseases. During times of war, 
infectious diseases have been known to devastate the fighting strength of militaries and 
their supporting populations.122 Thucydides, a general and historian of the Peloponnesian 
Wars, warned of the dangers and impact of disease. He recounted a plague that decimated 
as much as 25 percent of Athens’ population and altered the course of the Peloponnesian 
Wars.123 From this realization, the U.S. military has always encompassed health services 
within the organization, which dates back to formation of the Continental Army in 
1775.124 One of the first recorded instances of force health protection includes George 
                                                 
121 Kellie Moss and Josh Michaud, The U.S. Department of Defense and Global Health: Infectious 
Disease Efforts (Menlo Park, CA: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013), 1, 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/8504-the-u-s-department-of-defense-and-
global-health-infectious-disease-efforts.pdf. 
122 Matthew Smallman-Raynor and Andrew Cliff, War Epidemics: An Historical Geography of 
Infectious Diseases in Military Conflict and Civilian Strife, 1850–2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 4. 
123 Robert J. Littman, “The Plague of Athens: Epidemiology and Paleopathology,” The Mount Sinai 
Journal of Medicine 76, no. 5 (2009): 456, doi: 10.1002/msj.20137. 
124 “The U.S. Army Medical Department Regiment History,” U.S. Army Medical Department, last 
modified March 5, 2013, http://ameddregiment.amedd.army.mil/about/history.html.  
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Washington ordering “the inoculation of all Continental Army recruits” against smallpox 
in 1777.125 Nevertheless, infectious disease still “caused greater morbidity and mortality 
than battle injuries” for many conflicts in U.S. history.126 
Most recently, global health concerns have been increasingly tied to U.S. national 
security as a result of infectious disease outbreaks: HIV/AIDS outbreak in the 1980s, the 
H1N1 outbreak in 2009, and the West Africa Ebola outbreak at the time of this writing. 
Not only does this threat directly affect the American public, but it can destabilize other 
states and lead to regional insecurity. From these factors the DOD has a motivation to 
prevent or mitigate the effects of infectious disease globally.127 Also, the DOD has a 
primary role in U.S. efforts to combat biological weapons largely through non-
proliferation, counter-proliferation, and consequence management efforts.128  
B. ORGANIZATION 
There is no single organization in DOD with authority over its global health 
programs or activities, primarily because DOD is not a development agency and global 
health efforts are disperse and serve as a supporting activity.129 (The DOD mission “is to 
provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our 
country.”130) All health activities carried out by the DOD relate to the mission statement; 
yet, overlap exists where activities support the overall DOD mission and WHO member 
states’ compliance with IHR.  
The organizational structure of the DOD, under the Secretary of Defense, can be 
broken down into four key components. These components include the Office of the 
                                                 
125 “AMEDD History,” U.S. Army Medical Department, last modified August 16, 2012, 
http://ameddregiment.amedd.army.mil/about/ameddhistory.html.  
126 Moss and Michaud, The U.S. Department of Defense and Global Health, 1.  
127 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 7. 
128 “Who We Are,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency & USSTRATCOM Center for Combating 
WMD & Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Elimination, accessed September 3, 2014, 
http://www.dtra.mil/about/WhoWeAre.aspx.  
129 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 1, 9. 
130 “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed September 4, 
2014, http://www.defense.gov/about/#mission.  
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Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the 
military departments or services. Health activities are carried out under all four 
components.131  
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Figure 3 provides an organizational structure of The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), which emphasizes the agencies and activities involved with global 
health.  
 
Figure 3.  Office of the Secretary of Defense: Global Health Organizational Chart132 
OSD is the principal staff element for the Secretary of Defense. The office carries 
out “policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation 
responsibilities for the DOD.”133 Subordinate to the OSD are the Under Secretary of 
                                                 
131 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 11–12. 
132 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 12. 
133 “Office of the Secretary of Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, accessed September 7, 2014, 
http://www.defense.gov/osd/. 
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Defense (USD) offices, and subordinate to those are the offices of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (ASD). These offices form the nexus of the OSD. OSD also provides 
oversight and management of numerous defense agencies and field activities. Many of 
the OSD offices have health or health-related activities, or have oversight over agencies 
and activities that carry out these functions.134  
The ASD for Health Affairs (ASD-HA) exercises primary responsibility over the 
entire Military Health System (MHS) and serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary 
of Defense “for all DOD health and force health protection policies, programs, and 
activities.”135 In particular, the ASD-HA provides advice on global health engagement, 
medical research and development, and health surveillance.136 The Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Force Health Protection and Readiness 
(FHP&R) exist under ASD-HA, which has divisions in international health, civil-military 
medicine, and medical countermeasures among many others.137 Also, the Uniformed 
Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) functions under the ASD-HA; the 
university accepts international students and has numerous centers and institutes with 
implications for global health.  
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) operates as a defense agency 
under the direction of the USD for Policy. The agency’s mission is to oversee the 
execution of DOD security assistance and security cooperation programs under its 
responsibility.138 These programs include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Humanitarian 
Assistance (HA), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and partnership 
                                                 
134 “Office of the Secretary of Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense; Michaud, Moss, and Kates, 
U.S. Global Health Policy, 13. 
135 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive: Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Health Affairs (ASD(HA)), Number 5136.01 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 1.  
136 Ibid., 2.  
137 Force Health Protection & Readiness, “FHP&R Divisions,” The Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, last modified September 8, 2014, http://fhpr.dhhq.health.mil/home.aspx.  
138 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive: Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA), Number 5105.65 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 1.  
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capacity building among many others.139 Under DSCA, foreign military financing (FMF) 
has been used to procure medical equipment for partner states.140   
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is a defense agency under the 
OSD, more specifically the USD for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). 
The agency also serves as a combat support agency to the Combatant Commanders 
(CCDRs). DTRA’s primary mission is to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  
Under the USD for Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency is the 
National Center for Medical Intelligence. The NCMI prepares and coordinates 
“integrated, all-source intelligence for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and other 
government and international organizations on foreign health threats and other medical 
intelligence issues to protect U.S. interests worldwide.”141 The NCMI mainly provides 
medical intelligence support to military operations and commanders.142  
2. Organization of CJCS 
Figure 4 depicts the organizations involved in health activities under the Joint 
Staff.  
                                                 
139 “Programs,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed September 8, 2014, 
http://www.dsca.mil/about-us/programs-pgm. 
140 U.S. Department of Defense [DOD], DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP), Annual 
Report 2012 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), vi, 
http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nhrc/dhapp/countryreports/Documents/yearly12/FullReport12.pdf. 
141 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction: National Center for Medical 
Intelligence (NCMI), Number 6420.01 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 2. 
142 Ibid., 4. 
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Figure 4.  CJCS and the Joint Staff: Global Health Organizational Chart143 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) serves as the senior ranking 
member of the Armed Forces and the principal military adviser to the President, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NCS). The CJCS has no 
command authority; instead, command authority rests with each Combatant Commander 
(CCDR). The collective members of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) include the CJCS, the 
Vice Chairman, and the head of each military department to include the National Guard 
Bureau.144 The organization of the JCS has a supporting Joint Staff.  
The Joint Staff assists the CJCS with providing the “unified strategic direction of 
the combatant forces; their operation under unified command; and for their integration 
into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.”145 The Joint Staff includes the Joint 
Staff Surgeon and the Health Services Support Division. The Surgeon serves as the chief 
medical advisor to the CJCS. The Health Services Support Division coordinates health 
                                                 
143 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 13. 
144 The Joint Staff, “About the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed September 9, 
2014, http://www.jcs.mil/About.aspx. 
145 Ibid.  
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policies and operations across military services and combatant command authority 
(COCOM).146  
3. Combatant Commands 
Figure 5 provides the organizational structure for the CCMDs.  
 
Figure 5.  Combatant Commands: Organizational Chart147 
The DOD defines a Combatant Command (CCMD) as “a unified or specified 
command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so 
designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and 
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”148 Currently, there are nine 
CCMDs with each being assigned an Area of Responsibility (AOR). These AOR can 
either be a geographic region or a functional area.  
                                                 
146 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 13-14. 
147 Directorate for Organizational and Management Planning, “Organization of the Department of 
Defense,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, last modified March 2012, 
http://odam.defense.gov/Portals/43/Documents/Functions/Organizational%20Portfolios/Organizations%20
and%20Functions%20Guidebook/DoD_Organization_March_2012.pdf.  
148 U.S. Department of Defense, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 
1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), GL-5. 
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The authority each CCDR exercises within his or her AOR is known as COCOM. 
COCOM allows the CCDR to organize, employ, assign tasks, designate objectives, and 
ensure logistical support to the forces necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to 
that command.149 Within each CCMD is an Office of the Command Surgeon. The 
Command Surgeon, typically, serves as the CCDR’s primary advisor on all health related 
matters. The primary mission of Office of the Command Surgeon is to ensure the health 
service support and force health protection of the forces within the COCOM, while 
working with the supporting service component commands.  
CCMDs conduct global health missions when assigned by the Secretary of 
Defense such as Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. Military 
Health Support to Stability Operations (MSO) can also take place within a CCDR’s 
AOR. During MSO, the MHS must be able to “establish, reconstitute, and maintain 
health sector capacity and capability for the indigenous population when indigenous, 
foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals cannot do so.”150 Also, COCOM allows the CCDR 
to carry out Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events when they serve as a line of 
effort to theater campaign plan end state. Typically, TSC events seek to build partner 
capacity.    
4. Military Departments (under JCS) 
The DOD encompasses three military departments: the Department of the Navy, 
the Department of the Army, and the Department of the Air Force. The Department of the 
Navy encompasses both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps. Each military department 
is headed by a service chief. The service chiefs serve as a member on the JCS and are 
responsible for the management of his or her respective service.151 All three military 
departments have health activities involved in global health. Figure 6 highlights the 
military departments’ command structures and elements directly involved with global 
health. 
                                                 
149 Ibid., xx. 
150 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction: Military Health Support to 
Stability Operations, Number 6000.16 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 2. 
151 The Joint Staff, “About the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” 
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Figure 6.  Military Departments: Global Health Organizational Chart152 
                                                 
152 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 10. 
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a. Department of the Navy 
The naval elements of the MHS operate under the direction of the Navy Surgeon 
General, who also supports the U.S. Marine Corps. The Navy Surgeon General leads both 
the Office of the Navy Surgeon General and the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 
(BUMED).153 The Office of the Navy Surgeon General serves as a supporting staff to the 
Chief of Naval Operations; whereas, BUMED is a command headquarters for Navy 
Medicine. The majority of global health-related activities operate underneath BUMED 
and the Naval Medical Research Center. These activities include the overseas Naval 
Medical Research Units (NAMRUs) and the Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program 
(DHAPP).154  
b. Department of the Army 
Similar to the Department of the Navy, the MHS under the Department of the 
Army operates largely under the direction of the Army Surgeon General. The Army 
Surgeon General serves both as the commanding general for U.S. Army Medical 
Command (MEDCOM) and as a primary staff officer for the Office of the Surgeon 
General (OTSG) under the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). The OTSG 
develops policy and budget, whereas MEDCOM executes those actions. The staffs for 
both organizations have largely merged creating a “One Staff” to synchronize efforts.155  
Global health activities or activities that have implications on global health are 
numerous under the Department of the Army and OTSG. They include the Armed Forces 
Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC), the Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute 
(DMRTI), the U.S. Military Infectious Diseases Research Program, and the U.S. Military 
HIV Research Program (MHRP). The AFHSC oversees GEIS Division (AFHSC-GEIS) 
whose efforts support disease surveillance and response among deployed U.S. military 
                                                 
153 Ibid., 17. 
154 Ibid., 18. 
155 “Introduction to the U.S. Army Medical Department,” Army Medicine, U.S. Army, accessed 
September 9, 2014, http://armymedicine.mil/Pages/Introduction-to-the-US-Army-Medical-
Department.aspx.  
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personnel globally.156 Also, AFHSC-GEIS partners with 35 state partners to “conduct 
disease surveillance and rapid outbreak response, encourage research and innovation, and 
build capacity … partner activities are directed toward improvement of each country’s 
diagnostic and reporting requirements in accordance with World Health Organization’s 
International Health Regulations (2005) core capacities.”157 DMRTI offers courses in HA 
and MSO. Both DMRTI and MHRP are overseen by the Army Surgeon General but 
operate under other MEDCOM organizations.158  
MEDCOM’s global health activities primarily operate under the U.S. Army 
Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC). Subordinate organizations 
include the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) and the U.S. Army 
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). USAMRIID specializes 
in biodefense research and serves as a DOD reference laboratory for the identification of 
biological agents.159 WRAIR specializes in biomedical research and serves as the DOD 
lead agent for research in infectious disease. WRAIR subordinates include the Center for 
Infectious Disease Research and the Army’s research units located in infectious disease 
laboratories overseas in Kenya, Thailand, and Georgia.160   
c. Department of the Air Force 
The Air Force Surgeon General has “authority to commit resources worldwide for 
the Air Force Medical Service, to make decisions affecting the delivery of medical 
services, and to develop plans, programs and procedures to support worldwide medical 
service missions.” He or she also serves as the primary medical advisor to the Secretary 
of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff. The global health related activities of the 
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U.S. Air Force is much more limited than the other services; however, the activities 
highlight individual training in international health. The primary activities include the 
Defense Institute of Medical Operations (DIMO) and the International Health Specialists 
Program.161 
C. METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSIS 
An analysis of how DOD global health programs can support or do support IHR 
core capacities will be broken down by either a specified program or organization. The 
analysis will go beyond the selective global health programs designated by Congress and 
will include defense health programs, as well as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
programs. The analysis will expand upon the work already performed by the Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation that identifies DOD global health-related activities. Taking the 
analysis further will entail identifying the particular programs that correspond to IHR 
core capacities and their possible impact to improve compliance.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
The extent of research and analysis of DOD global health programs is constrained 
to open source information. No interviews, For Official Use Only (FOUO), or classified 
information were gathered for the analysis. The work builds off the previous analysis of 
DOD global health policy, programs, and organizations, as well as the stated goals of 
those programs and organizations.  
The greatest limitation of the analysis is separating the extent of intra- and 
interagency coordination, as well as discerning the exact funding for each particular 
program. Many of the DOD activities are not constrained to a single DOD office or 
command. For example, in FY09, AFHSC-GEIS funded training programs for 
Geographic CCMDs through the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance 
                                                 
161 Michaud, Moss, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 18-19. 
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Medicine (CDHAM), which is part of USUHS.162 By extending credit solely to AFHSC-
GEIS, it neglects the contributions of the supporting organizations. 
Moreover, an organization may receive resources through multiple funding 
streams and connecting an outcome to a particular funded program may prove 
impractical. The DOD overseas laboratories receive funding through numerous defense 
health programs; to avoid error, the overseas laboratories efforts will be captured as a 
supporting effort to other entities. 
Finally, the analysis of HA/DR programs will not be evaluated. While, HA/DR 
efforts can assist partner states in response to infectious disease outbreaks, they are 
reactive not proactive efforts to increase response capacity. HA/DR are entirely scenario 
dependent and based upon host country requests.  
E. ACTIVITIES, FUNDING, AND ANALYSIS 
The activities selected in this section represent the DOD global health-related 
activities that not only correlate to IHR core capacities but also support or build upon 
those capacities. Some of these activities are DOD organizations, funded programs, or 
both. The activities that support the IHR core capacities include the AFHSC-GEIS, the 
DOD overseas laboratories, DHAPP/MHRP, and the Cooperative Biological Engagement 
Program (CBEP).  
1. Global Emerging Infectious Disease System  
The DOD-GEIS emerged from Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7, released 
in 1996, that sought to expand the “support of global surveillance, training, research, and 
response to emerging infectious disease threats.”163 Initially, DOD-GEIS operated as a 
program requirement predicated on existing DOD resources and operations. Activities 
                                                 
162 Jean L. Otto et al., “Training Initiatives within the AFHSC-Global Emerging Infections 
Surveillance and Response System: Support for IHR (2005),” BMC Public Health 11, suppl. 2 (2011): S5, 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/S2/S5. 
163 White House, Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7: Emerging Infectious Diseases, 1996, 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html.  
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were coordinated from a Central Hub office located within WRAIR. In 2008, the 
program was transferred to and created as a division under AFHSC.164  
By 2010, the newly renamed AFHSC-GEIS began to integrate the guidelines set 
forth by the WHO IHR into all surveillance activities. Currently, “AFHSC-GEIS 
provides direction, funding and oversight to a network of over 35 partners based in all 
regions of the world. Working in conjunction with their host nations, these partners 
conduct disease surveillance and rapid outbreak response, encourage research and 
innovation, and build capacity.”165 
AFHSC receives defense health program funds from the DASD (FHP&R) with a 
budget of $71.38 million for FY2014.166 The budget has grown consistently since 
FY2009. For FY2015, the budget allocated to AFHSC is projected to grow by $6.053 
million for the purpose of biosurveillance.167  
The strategic model for the organization is built upon four strategic goals 
concentrated on five categories of infectious disease. Figure 7 illustrates the AFHSC-
GEIS strategic model. The achievements (outputs) outlined in the FY2010 AFHSC-GEIS 
Annual Report can be both aligned against the strategic goals of AFHSC-GEIS and the 
WHO IHR core capacities. 
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Figure 7.  AFHSC-GEIS Strategic Model168 
a. Surveillance and Response  
Analysis of the achievements aligned with the GEIS strategic goal of surveillance 
and response overwhelmingly correspond to the IHR core capacity of surveillance, and to 
a much smaller degree the IHR core capacity of response. Overall, the program goal of 
surveillance and response account for the second greatest amount of achievements 
outlined for FY2010. Table 8 provides a breakdown of the analysis and the key partners 
involved.  
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Table 8.   AFHSC-GEIS: Analysis of Surveillance and Response Program 
Goal Achievements169 
                                                 
169 “Global Emerging Infections Surveillance & Response System,” AFHSC; WHO, “IHR Core 
Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26–55; Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging 
Infections Surveillance and Response System, Fiscal Year 2010, “Partnering in the Fight against Emerging 
Infections,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18. 
Related IHR Core Capacity or Hazardb Outputs (FY10 AFHSC-GEIS Achievements)c
Surveillance Supports national surveillance in 75 countries.
Response Responded to 48 disease outbreak requests for assistance in 17 different countries.
Surveillance
Established and maintained Influenza-like Illness (ILI) surveillance in 10 South and Central American 
countries, totaling 52 sites (NAMRU-6, PHCR-South).
Response
Supported pandemic surge response through collection and analysis of over 81,000 samples for 
A/H1N1 (USAFSAM, NHRC, LRMC). 
Surveillance and Zoonotic Events (IHR 
Hazard)
Conducted influenza surveillance at the human-animal interface in seven countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Europe to identify transmission risk factors and potential new zoonotic influenza virus strains 
(AFRIMS, GVFI, NAMRU-2, University of Florida, USAMRU-K). 
Surveillance
Identified West Nile Virus seropositive samples, from Kabul, Kandahar and Helmond Provinces in 
Afghanistan, with seroprevalences similar to those documented in Egypt (11% IgG, and 0.7% IgM 
positive)(NAMRU-3).
Surveillance Collaborated with Syrian scientists in diagnosing 31 cases of Leishmania tropica (NAMRU-3).
Surveillance
Successfully transported, tested, and diagnosed 29 cases of undiagnosed febrile illness in rural Kenya 
using improved laboratory infrastructure (P. falciparum: 27, P. vivax: 1, and Burkholderia meliodosis 
(B. cepacia complex): 1) (USAMRU-K). 
Surveillance
Confirmed scrub typhus infection in 2.5% of serum samples from febrile patients in Cambodia 
(NAMRU-2).
Surveillance
Identified two new Dengue virus type-1 (DENV-1) lineages in Myanmar, one indistinguishable from a 
2006 circulating DENV-1 strain in southern China, and the other indistinguishable from a strain 
circulating in Vietnam (AFRIMS).
Preparedness Forecasted the January-February 2010 Rift Valley Fever outbreaks in South Africa (NASA). 
Preparedness
Characterized the prevalence of spotted fever group (30.4%) and typhus group (5.8%) rickettsial 
infections in undiagnosed febrile illness cases in Kenya (NMRC, USAMRU-K). 
Response and Surveillance
Provided laboratory support for cholera outbreaks in collaboration with the Nepalese National Public 
Health Laboratory (NPHL) and the Walter Reed/AFRIMS Research Unit Nepal (WARUN). In October 
2009, WARUN reported 52% of stool samples from a diarrheal outbreak had Vibrio cholerae. In April 
2010, V. cholera was detected in 14 NPHL samples from an outbreak in western Nepal (AFRIMS). 
Response
Provided laboratory support to the Cambodian Ministry of Health during a V. cholera outbreak and 
demonstrated resistance to the first-line antibiotic, tetracycline, among most of the isolates; thereby 
contributing to public health officials’ modifications of their guidance (NAMRU-2). 
Surveillance
Confirmed the presence of Plasmodium falciparum artemisinin resistance in Cambodia, and studied 
the dose-dependent risk of neutropenia occurring after 7-day courses of artesunate monotherapy in 
Cambodian patients with acute falciparum malaria (AFRIMS).
Surveillance and Response
Assisted in the identification of Streptococcus suis from a specimen referred to Naval Medical 
Research Unit No. 2 for antimicrobial susceptibility testing, prompting an epidemiological 
investigation by World Health Organization and Cambodia-Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (NAMRU-2).
Program Goals: Conduct surveillance and outbreak response activities.a
a. Strategic program goals taken from AFHSC-GEIS website (“Global Emerging Infections Surveillance & Response System,” Armed Forces 
Health Surveillance Center, accessed September 10, 2014, http://www.afhsc.mil/geis.). 
b. Each output relates to a IHR core-capacity or hazard based on the IHR Core Capacity Montoring Framework Checklists (WHO, "IHR Core 
Capacity Monitoring Framework," 26-55.)
c. Outputs (achievements) were gathered using the FY2010 GEIS Annual Report .  Outputs that did not relate to the IHR were omitted.  
(Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, Fiscal Year 2010, “Partnering in the 
Fight against Emerging Infections," Department of Defense (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18.  
 55 
b. Training and Capacity Building 
The majority of achievements declared by AFHSC-GEIS for FY2010 correspond 
to strategic program goal of training and capacity building for partnered states. These 
achievements largely prescribe to both the IHR core capacities of surveillance and 




Table 9.   AFHSC-GEIS: Analysis of Training and Capacity Building Program Goals170 
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
Related IHR Core Capacityb Outputs (FY10 AFHSC-GEIS Achievements)c
Laboratory and Human Resources
Provided training in laboratory testing and epidemiology of influenza, malaria, diarrheal disease and other EIDs to 1,614 medical and laboratory personnel from 31 countries in 
Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (NAMRU-3, USAMRU-K).
Laboratory, Surveillance, and Human Resources
Supported training in surveillance, diagnostic testing and response of influenza, febrile illness, leishmaniasis, and bacterial/enteric disease diagnosis to over 200 medical and 
laboratory personnel from the South American region (NAMRU-6, PHCR-South).
Laboratory and Surveillance
Trained 1,049 Royal Thai Army (RTA) staff in support of military unit-based surveillance at five border areas in Thailand as well as 20 civilian and over 70 Cambodian military 
personnel in basic malaria microscopy and diagnostics (AFRIMS).
Laboratory, Surveillance, and Human Resources
Trained five Cambodian National Institute of Public Health/NAMRU-2 technicians and 30 Cambodian nationals in influenza strain sequencing, surveillance and epidemiology; 
provided bacterial laboratory testing support to six Ministry of Health District/Provincial hospitals (NAMRU-2).
Laboratory, Surveillance, and Human Resources
Supported training of 40 medical and laboratory personnel from four countries in East/Central Africa on basic malaria microscopy, influenza, diagnoses of sexually transmitted 
infections, enteric infections and other febrile illness.
Surveillance and Response Helped establish National Influenza Centers (NICs) in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Togo and Cote d’Ivoire, and supported NICs in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (NAMRU-3, USAMRU-K).
Human Resources Trained 39 students from 18 countries toward their Certification in Emerging Infectious Diseases (University of Florida).
Laboratory, Surveillance, Response, and Human Resources Trained over 200 laboratorians and scientists throughout Central and South America on epidemiology, outbreak response and laboratory diagnostic techniques (NAMRU-6). 
Preparedness, Response, and Human Resources
Conducted 14 training sessions, training 607 individuals from 19 countries in support of US Combatant Command partnerships improving the abilities of local Ministries of 
Defense and Health to respond to and prevent emerging disease threats (CDHAM).
Response
Collaborated with WHO’s Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office to conduct training on molecular genetics and sequencing for students from the NICs of Egypt, Morocco and 
Oman, thereby helping these NICs identify new influenza strains and track the emergence of antiviral drugs resistance (NAMRU-3).
Surveillance and Response Worked with host country counterparts to establish new NICs in Burkina Faso and Togo and provided continued support to existing NIC in Cote d’Ivoire (NAMRU-3).
Coordination and Communication Partnered and coordinated with Institute Pasteur and host country counterparts to support and enhance the NIC capabilities in the Kingdom of Cambodia (NAMRU-2).
Coordination and Communication
Developed new military-to-military (mil-mil) partnerships in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia for respiratory disease surveillance (AFRIMS, GVFI, NAMRU-3, 
USAMRU-K, PHCR-S).
Laboratory
Increased Lassa Diagnostic Laboratory capability in Sierra Leone’s Kenema Government Hospital by adding a state-of-the-art satellite system for email communication, and a 
liquid nitrogen generator for improved sample storage and shipping (USAMRIID).
Preparedness
Geographically expanded surveillance of artemisinin resistant Plasmodium falciparum in Southeast Asia to better characterize the spread, and inform malaria containment 
efforts executed by World Health Organization (WHO) and local malaria control programs (AFRIMS and NAMRU-2).
Laboratory and Human Resources
Conducted a Malaria Microscopy Training Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP) as part of Honest Talon 10-01, training 43 Tanzanians and identifying seven trainees as 
mentors (USAMRU-K).
Surveillance Assisted in funding two surveillance sites in Kericho, Kenya as part of an enteric infections surveillance field network and proposed vaccine testing sites (USAMRU-K). 
Response
Instituted a surveillance system in intensive care units in Egyptian and Jordanian hospitals to estimate infection rates and antimicrobial resistance patterns associated with 
medical devices.
Surveillance and Laboratory
Instituted surveillance at the primary STI referral clinic in Djibouti and enhanced clinic laboratory capabilities to culture N. gonorrhoeae and perform antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing (NAMRU-3).
Program Goals: Expand surveillance and epidemiology training and capacity building within the US military and in partner nations.a
a. Strategic program goals taken from AFHSC-GEIS website (“Global Emerging Infections Surveillance & Response System,” Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, accessed September 10, 2014, http://www.afhsc.mil/geis.). 
b. Each output relates to a IHR core-capacity or hazard based on the IHR Core Capacity Montoring Framework Checklists (WHO, "IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework," 26-55.)
c. Outputs (achievements) were gathered using the FY2010 GEIS Annual Report .  Outputs that did not relate to the IHR were omitted.  (Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response 
System, Fiscal Year 2010, “Partnering in the Fight against Emerging Infections," Department of Defense (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18.  
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c. Research, Innovation, and Integration 
The achievements that correspond to the program goal for research, innovation, 
and integration mostly align to the IHR core capacity of preparedness. These 
preparedness activities mostly align due to their risk assessment modeling. Table 10 
provides the analysis of these program goals.  
 
Table 10.   AFHSC-GEIS: Analysis of Research, Innovation, and Integration 
Program Goals171 




Core Capacity Outputs (FY10 AFHSC-GEIS Achievements)
Support research, innovation and integration 
initiatives that emphasize an eventual product 
that will enhance force health protection such 
as drug and diagnostic tool development. Surveillance
Continued support and enhancement of electronic Unit-
Based Surveillance (UBS) project in collaboration with the 
Royal Thai Army (AFRIMS).
 Surveillance
Initiated the first phase of deployment for open source 
electronic surveillance and early warning system for resource 
limited settings (JHU/APL).
 Preparedness
Created an accurate model for predicting Japanese 
encephalitis (JE) risk (using presence of the vector Culex 
tritaeniorhynchus and other factors) in Korea, and piloted 
expansion of the predictive model using JE & other illnesses 
in Southeast Asia (JE, Chikungunya), South and Central Asia 
(JE, leishmaniasis), Indonesia (malaria) and Peru 
(Bartonellosis) (USUHS). 
 Preparedness
Developed monthly normalized difference vegetation index 
(NDVI) and land surface temperature anomaly maps and 
space-time (Hovmoller) plots for Ukraine/SE Europe, the 
Middle East, Turkey and Afghanistan as part of the 
development of a predictive analysis tool for tick-borne 
diseases (CCHF and rickettsial diseases) in the region (NASA).
 Preparedness
Established VectorMap (www.vectormap.org) which now 
contains over 13,200 datasets in MosquitoMap 
(www.mosquitomap.org) from 140 countries; 50,000 datasets 
from 52 African countries in TickMap (www.tickmap.org); and 
3,400 datasets in SandflyMap (www.sandflymap.org) 
(WRAIR). 
 Preparedness
Continued characterization of drug sensitivity patterns in 
Kenya to inform DoD product development and malaria 
public health officials in Kenya (USAMRU-K).
a. Strategic program goals taken from AFHSC-GEIS website (“Global Emerging Infections Surveillance & Response System,” 
Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, accessed September 10, 2014, http://www.afhsc.mil/geis.). 
b. Each output relates to a IHR core-capacity or hazard based on the IHR Core Capacity Montoring Framework Checklists 
(WHO, "IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework," 26-55.)
c. Outputs (achievements) were gathered using the FY2010 GEIS Annual Report .  Outputs that did not relate to the IHR were 
omitted.  (Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, Fiscal 
Year 2010, “Partnering in the Fight against Emerging Infections," Department of Defense (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2010), 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18.  
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d. Assessment and Communication of Value Added 
All achievements aligned to the strategic program goal for assessment and 
communication of value added reasonably aligns to the IHR core capacity of coordination 
and communication. Table 11 provides the analysis of these achievements.  
 
Table 11.   AFHSC-GEIS: Analysis of Assessment and Communication of 
Program Goals172 
2. U.S. Army and Navy Overseas Laboratories 
The DOD overseas laboratories include both Army and Navy assets and operate 
under WRAIR and NMRC respectively. The core function of the overseas laboratories is 
to conduct medical research that will contribute to overall military readiness. The 
research can lead to the development of vaccines, prophylactic drugs, and medical 
devices; it also increases the knowledge base on specific diseases. These achievements 
not only benefit military readiness but also the global community. Nonetheless, it is the 
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Program Goalsa
Related IHR Core 
Capacityb Outputs (FY10 AFHSC-GEIS Achievements)c
Assessment and 
communication of value 
added by the network.
Coordination and 
Communication
Conducted “Conferencia Regional Andina sobre Enfermedades Infecciosas”, a three day 
conference on emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) with participants and regional health 




Developed steering committees for respiratory infection, gastrointestinal infection, malaria 
and febrile and vector-borne infection programs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 




Conducted regional conference for over 120 public health leaders from 12 Central and South 
American countries and multiple international health organizations on public health 




Established the Respiratory Pathogen Surveillance Steering Committee to improve the 





Engaged the Malaria Surveillance Steering Committee to identify and prioritize surveillance 
needs, formulate surveillance goals, and improve the overall effectiveness of AFHSC malaria 




Established an Enterics Surveillance Steering Committee to assist GEIS in identifying 
surveillance needs, formulating surveillance goals and improving overall effectiveness of 
the DoD enteric surveillance (AFHSC).
a. Strategic program goals taken from AFHSC-GEIS website (“Global Emerging Infections Surveillance & Response System,” Armed Forces 
Health Surveillance Center, accessed September 10, 2014, http://www.afhsc.mil/geis.). 
b. Each output relates to a IHR core-capacity or hazard based on the IHR Core Capacity Montoring Framework Checklists (WHO, "IHR Core 
Capacity Monitoring Framework," 26-55.)
c. Outputs (achievements) were gathered using the FY2010 GEIS Annual Report .  Outputs that did not relate to the IHR were omitted.  
(Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, Fiscal Year 2010, “Partnering in 
the Fight against Emerging Infections," Department of Defense (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 
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laboratories other activities, global disease detection and capacity-building, that can help 
contribute to partner states’ IHR compliance.173  
The U.S. Army and Navy overseas laboratories largely contribute to global 
disease detection and capacity-building through funding by AFHSC-GEIS, DTRA, and 
PEPFAR. AFHSC-GEIS accounted for more than 20 percent of DOD overseas 
laboratories’ budget in FY2010.174 AFHSC-GEIS provides more funding than the 
Military Infectious Diseases Research Program (MIDRP), which more closely aligns to 
the DOD laboratories core function.175 Contributions from PEPFAR amounted to $23 
million and DTRA provided less than $1 million in FY2010.176 USAMRU-K received 
the sum of PEPFAR funds to go toward care and treatment, and DTRA provides funds 
that go toward biosafety and biosecurity.177 
The laboratories are a prerequisite for the AFHSC-GEIS to carry out its mission. 
They also service as WHO Collaborating Centers (NAMRU-3 and AFRIMS) and WHO 
Reference Laboratories (NAMRU-3 and USAMRU-K).178 The laboratories are generally 
considered to be national assets by the host state, and have been integrated into the public 
health system.179 The DOD overseas laboratories’ activities relating to achieving WHO 
member state IHR compliance are included under the preceding AFHSC-GEIS program 
and the subsequent DTRA led Cooperative Biological Engagement Program; therefore, a 
further analysis will not be provided.  
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3. Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program and Military HIV Research 
Program 
Mandated by DOD Directive 6485.02E, DHAPP supports all DOD global 
HIV/AIDS prevention programs and operates under the Naval Health Research Center in 
San Diego, California.180 DHAPP aims to “reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS among 
uniformed personnel across the globe.”181 The program achieves its stated mission by 
supporting HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment of military members and their 
family in more than 80 nation states since inception.182 This can extend to the greater 
civilian population when the military or its facilities are responsible for health activities 
within the state.183  
DHAPP receives funding from the Defense Health Programs (DHP) and 
PEPFAR. The combined budget was $55.1 million in FY2012 with the majority, $47.1 
million, coming from PEPFAR. Each state program can only receive funding from one 
source, either PEPFAR or DHP.184  
 
Table 12.   DHAPP: Analysis of Outputs Related to IHR Core Capacities185 
Table 12 lists the related IHR core capacities based on DHAPP achievements in 
FY2010. These achievements were aggregated and do not disassociate activities by state 
program; however, it does demonstrate that the activities do span four distinct IHR core 
capacities. Table 13 provides the list of countries with active DHAPP state programs. 
                                                 
180 DOD, DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP), vi.  
181 “DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program,” Navy Medicine, U.S. Navy, accessed September 29, 
2014, http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nhrc/dhapp/Pages/default.aspx.  
182 DOD, DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP), vi. 
183 Ibid., iv.  
184 Moss and Michaud, The U.S. Department of Defense and Global Health, 22. 
185 DOD, DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP), iv.  
FY2012 Acheivement Related IHR Core-Capacity
3,377 health care workers were trained to provide HIV clinical services Response
473,328 military and family members were counseled and tested for HIV infection and received 
their test results Surveillance
665,785 military and family members were reached with comprehensive prevention messages Risk Communication
243 new laboratories were equipped and supported for HIV testing and diagnostics Laboratory
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While these programs have tangible achievements, they are limited in scope to primarily 
military-to-military engagements and focused on HIV/AIDS. Also, Table 13 identifies 
the state programs where MHRP operates. 
 
Table 13.   FY2012 DHAPP/MHRP State Programs: By CCMD and Fund 
Source186 
                                                 
186 DOD, DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP), 208–09. 
CENTCOM EUCOM
Angola (PEPFAR) Estonia (DHP)
Benin (DHP) Georgia (DHP)
Botswana (PEPFAR) Moldova (DHP)
Burkina Faso (DHP) Romania (DHP)
Burundi (PEPFAR) Serbia (DHP)
Cameroon (PEPFAR) Ukraine (PEPFAR)
Central African Republic (DHP)
Chad (DHP) SOUTHCOM
Côte d’Ivoire (PEPFAR) Antigua and Barbuda (PEPFAR)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (PEPFAR) Bahamas, The (PEPFAR)
Djibouti (PEPFAR) Barbados (PEPFAR)
Ethiopia (PEPFAR) Belize (PEPFAR)
Gabon (DHP) Bolivia (DHP)
Gambia, The (DHP) Colombia (DHP)
Ghana (PEPFAR) Dominican Republic (PEPFAR)
Guinea (DHP) Ecuador (DHP)
Kenya (PEPFAR)ab El Salvador (PEPFAR)
Lesotho (PEPFAR) Guatemala (PEPFAR)
Liberia (PEPFAR) Guyana (PEPFAR)
Malawi (PEPFAR) Honduras (PEPFAR)
Mali (DHP) Jamaica (PEPFAR)
Morocco (DHP) Nicaragua (PEPFAR)
Mozambique (PEPFAR)a Peru (DHP)
Namibia (PEPFAR) St. Kitts and Nevis (PEPFAR)
Niger (DHP) Suriname (PEPFAR)
Nigeria (PEPFAR)ab Trinidad and Tobago (PEPFAR)
Republic of the Congo (DHP)
Rwanda (PEPFAR) PACOM
Sao Tomé and Principe (DHP) Indonesia (PEPFAR)
Senegal (PEPFAR) Laos (DHP)
Sierra Leone (DHP) Timor-Leste (DHP)







Union of Comoros (DHP)
Zambia (PEPFAR)
FY2012 DHAPP State Programs By CCMD (Fund Source)
a Represents states in which MHRP operates (MHRP also operates in Thailand)
b Represents states with DHAPP overseen by MHRP
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Congress initiated MHRP in 1986, to protect military service members and serve 
the global community by, ultimately, developing a globally effective HIV vaccine.187 
The program operates under the command of WRAIR and utilizes a network of overseas 
research sites in six countries to accomplish its vision.188 While the program’s primary 
focus is in research towards a vaccine, it also carries out HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and 
treatment as a contributor of PEPFAR. PEPFAR contributed $47.2 million to MHRP in 
FY2012, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) provided $42.7 million.189 The 
remaining funding for MHRP in FY2012 amounted to $38.5 million, which originated 
from congressional special interest and U.S. Army research, development, test, and 
evaluation funding.190  
Table 14 reveals achievements that correspond to IHR core capacities by MHRP 
location. The listing of achievements was obtained through MHRP state-specific fact 
sheets and is not constrained to a single year. While the goal of MHRP is for HIV 
research, the program has implications for IHR core capacity compliance. The primary 
implications on core capacities are with regards to surveillance, response, laboratory, and 
risk communication—similar to DHAPP.  
                                                 
187 U.S. Military HIV Research Program, U.S. Military HIV Research Program: Strategic Plan, June 
28, 2010 (Silver Springs, MD: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 2010), 3.  
188 U.S. Military HIV Research Program, “About MHRP,” Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 
accessed October 2, 2014, http://www.hivresearch.org/about.php.  





Table 14.   MHRP: Analysis of Outputs to IHR Related Core Capacities191 
 
                                                 
191 U.S. Military HIV Research Program, Makerere University Walter-Reed Project: Country Fact Sheet (Silver Springs, MD: Walter Reed Army Institute 
of Research, 2014), http://www.hivresearch.org/media/pnc/1/media.761.pdf; U.S. Military HIV Research Program, U.S. Military HIV Research Program in 
Thailand: Country Fact Sheet (Silver Springs, MD: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 2014), www.hivresearch.org; U.S. Military HIV Research Program 
Walter-Reed Project-Nigeria: Country Fact Sheet (Silver Springs, MD: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 2014), 
http://www.hivresearch.org/media/pnc/8/media.828.pdf; U.S. Military HIV Research Program Walter-Reed Project-Kenya: Country Fact Sheet (Silver Springs, 
MD: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 2014), http://www.hivresearch.org/media/pnc/8/media.758.pdf; U.S. Military HIV Research Program Walter-Reed 
Project-Tanzania: Country Fact Sheet (Silver Springs, MD: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 2014), 
http://www.hivresearch.org/media/pnc/6/media.856.pdf.  
MHRP Sites Kenya Uganda Nigeria Tanzania
Achievement (IHR 
related core-capacity)
Supported HIV counseling and testing for 
459,000 individuals (Surveillance)
Renovated two HIV clinics and supports a 
total of seven HIV/ART clinic sites 
(Surveillance)
Supported HIV testing and 
counseling for 70,000 individuals 
(Surveillance)
Supported HIV testing and 




Maintained the first and only College of 
American Pathologists (CAP)-accredited lab 
in Kenya (Laboratory)
Supported HIV counseling and testing to 
more than 100,000 individuals 
(Surveillance)
Opened a Defense Reference 
Laboratory (DRL) to serve as a 
reference laboratory for Nigerian 
military hospital laboratories and 
PEPFAR-supported research and 
diagnostics (Laboratory)
Increased laboratory capacity in 
with training, technology 
transfer, and College of 




Supported community based outreach 
(Risk Communication)
Trained more than 200 laboratory 
staff in the accurate diagnosis of 
malaria infections, QA/QC and 
laboratory supervision (Laboratory)
Supported the estabilishment 
of pandemic influenza and 




Trained Kayunga District health care 
providers to offer routine testing and 
counseling to all hospital clients 
(Response)
Contributed to and supports national 




Supported two laboratory training 
centers (Laboratory) 
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4. Cooperative Biological Engagement Program 
CBEP is a component of the larger Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
(CTR), which aims “to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
related materials, technologies, facilities, and expertise.”192 Originally, CBEP focused on 
securing and dismantling the extensive biological weapons complex Russia inherited 
from the Soviet Union; however, the program extended globally in 2008. As part of this 
mission expansion, CBEP now serves two purposes: to enhance biological safety and 
security, as well as disease detection, diagnosis, and reporting within partner states. 
Under the direction of OSD, DTRA carries out the activities of CBEP in coordination 
with host states, interagency partners, and CCMDs.  
Funding for CBEP has risen drastically since its inception. In FY2007, CBE 
funding amounted to $72.36 million; whereas, in FY2014, the amount appropriated was 
$260 million. Also the percentage of spending on CBEP as part of the larger CTR 
program grew from only 10 percent in the late 1990s to 60 percent by FY2014.193 The 
FY2015 budget for CBEP, however, is estimated to be reduced by $3.238 million as 
compared to FY2014.194  
                                                 
192 Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA], Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates: Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), CTR-1137.  
193 Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues 
for Congress, R43143, Congressional Research Service, 2014, 35, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf.  
194 DTRA, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates, CTR-1153. 
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Table 15.   CBEP: Analysis of FY2015 Requested Projects to IHR Core 
Capacities195 
As evident in Table 15, CBEP aligns greatly with the laboratory and surveillance 
IHR core capacities. For FY2015, the proposed activities are spread out globally, minus 
South America. CBEP, like AFHSC-GEIS, is distinct in that it has stated objectives to 
assist partner states to meet their obligations towards IHR compliance.196 The program 
also uses numerous partners like the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance 
Medicine (CDHAM) and the DOD overseas laboratories to execute its activities.197  
F. HOW TO USE THE DATA 
DOD global health activities are diverse and complex. Most activities involve 
numerous organizations and are dependent upon outside organizations to execute mission 
                                                 
195 Ibid., CTR1169-72. 
196 Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, “Cooperative Biological Engagement 
Program (CBEP),” Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.cdham.org/cooperative-biological-engagement-program-pakistan. 
197 Ibid.  
Fund BS&S enhancements IHR Related Core-Capacity
Fund disease detection, diagnosis and reporting 
enhancements IHR Related Core-Capacity
Continue BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in 
Armenia and Ukraine Laboratory
Continue human and veterinary training in 
epidemiology, laboratory management, and disease 
diagnosis in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine Surveillance and Laboratory
Complete construction of the CRL in Kazakhstan Laboratory
Continue transition of sustainment of laboratories in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine Laboratory
Continue oversight on construction of CRL in Azerbaijan and 
installation of BS&S systems and equipment Laboratory
Complete EIDSS implementation, training and upgrades 
in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan Surveillance
Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard 
Operating Procedures across the Former Soviet Union Laboratory
Conduct training in epidemiology, laboratory 
management and disease diagnosis in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, and up to three new countries in Africa Surveillance and Laboratory
Continue the provision of Biorisk Management training in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine Laboratory
Install laboratory equipment in up to three new 
countries in Africa Laboratory
Complete BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in 
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania Laboratory
Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Iraq 
and Afghanistan Laboratory
Initiate BS&S upgrades to human and veterinary laboratories in up 
to three new countries in Africa Laboratory Fill gaps in diagnostics and reporting in Jordan Surveillance
Conduct Biorisk Management training in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
and up to three new countries in Africa Laboratory Continue epidemiology training in Iraq and Afghanistan Surveillance
Continue laboratory upgrades in Iraq and Afghanistan Laboratory
Continue EIDSS and PACS installation and operator 
training in Iraq Surveillance
Continue Biorisk Management training in Iraq and Afghanistan Laboratory Continue diagnostic training in Iraq Laboratory
Continue the development and implementation of BS&S Standard 
Operating Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan Laboratory
Continue installation of laboratory equipment in Lao 
PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam Laboratory
Conduct Biorisk Management workshops in Philippines and 
Indonesia and fill identified gaps Human Resources
Install laboratory equipment in Philippines and 
Indonesia Laboratory
Continue Biorisk Management workshops in Lao PDR, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam Laboratory
Initiate lab management training in Philippines and 
Indonesia Laboratory
Initiate the development and implementation of BS&S Standard 
Operating Procedures in Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam Laboratory
Introduce EIDSS and PACS to human and vet ministries 
in Philippines Surveillance
Continue laboratory management training in Cambodia 
and Vietnam Laboratory
Conduct laboratory management training in Lao PDR Laboratory
Complete laboratory diagnostic training/capacity 
building activity in Cambodia Laboratory
Former Soviet Union
Africa
Middle East and South Asia
Southeast Asia
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goals or objectives. The analysis reveals that the military service departments own the 
preponderance of assets that align to building IHR core capacities. Primarily these are 
organizations under the U.S. Army and Navy. DTRA, however, under the OSD and 
through the CBEP, also greatly contributes to IHR compliance with regards to the 
laboratory core capacity. DTRA builds global laboratory capacity and capability through 
the construction of Central Reference Laboratories (CRL), installation of laboratory 
equipment, initiation of training programs, and execution of security upgrades.  
It appears that all DOD global health programs and organizations analyzed are 
involved with building laboratory partner capacity. The DOD has the unique assets of the 
overseas laboratories that are essential with these activities. The DOD laboratories also 
assist AFHSC-GEIS in conducting surveillance activities with partner states. Out of the 
programs analyzed, AFHSC-GEIS most align to building surveillance core capacities in 
partner states.  
The analysis in this chapter is meant to identify the organizations and programs 
that can assist WHO member states achieve IHR compliance. IHR compliance is not the 
primary objective for any of the organizations and programs; therefore, this analysis is 
not meant as a critique of the DOD organizations and programs. Instead, by illustrating 
how the DOD organizations and programs build IHR core capacities abroad either 
directly or indirectly, then those efforts could expand or contract based on actual IHR 
compliance data.  
Authors have argued that laboratory services are the “Achilles heel” of IHR 
compliance in the developing world and resources have followed accordingly; however, 
based on WHO member state reporting it appears national legislation and preparedness 
are core capacities least in compliance.198 Table 16 displays IHR compliance rates in 
Africa for 2013. The averages for each core capacity are located in the last row. 
Laboratory and surveillance rank first and second respectively. This may provide 
evidence that DOD and USG efforts are working in Africa, but also may signify a needed 
                                                 
198 Ruth Berkelman, Gail Cassell, Steven Specter, Margaret Hamburg, and Keith Klugman, “The 
‘Achilles’ Heel of Global Efforts to Combat Infectious Diseases, Clinical Infectious Disease 42, no. 10 
(2006), 1503-1504, doi: 10.1086/504494. 
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shift in focus. None of the programs analyzed aligned against the IHR core capacity for 
national legislation, policy, and financing. Most likely, this is due to DOD being ill-suited 
as an organization to address or assist partner states in crafting national laws, regulations, 
and policy for sufficient IHR implementation.  
With regards to preparedness, AFHSC-GEIS had the most amount of outputs 
aligned to that core capacity. Most of these outputs were under the program’s strategic 
goal for research, innovation, and integration. The activities largely included mapping or 
predicting national health risks. Due to the low IHR compliance rates in preparedness, the 




Table 16.   Africa 2013 IHR Compliance Data199 
                                                 
199 WHO, “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring Framework: All Capacities Data by Country.” 
Country Status Core Capacity Status Core Capacity Status Core Capacity Status Core Capacity Status Core Capacity Status Core Capacity Status Core Capacity Status Core Capacity
Botswana 0 Legislation 10 Coordination 70 Surveillance 52 Response 0 Preparedness 29 Risk communication 20 Human resources 81 Laboratory
Burkina Faso 100 Legislation 80 Coordination 65 Surveillance 87 Response 45 Preparedness 43 Risk communication 60 Human resources 86 Laboratory
Burundi 0 Legislation 73 Coordination 100 Surveillance 82 Response 50 Preparedness 57 Risk communication 0 Human resources 41 Laboratory
Cameroon 100 Legislation 100 Coordination 85 Surveillance 94 Response 100 Preparedness 100 Risk communication 100 Human resources 100 Laboratory
Central African Republic 0 Legislation 0 Coordination 40 Surveillance 47 Response 16 Preparedness 14 Risk communication 40 Human resources 43 Laboratory
Chad 25 Legislation 30 Coordination 75 Surveillance 59 Response 8 Preparedness 57 Risk communication 20 Human resources 41 Laboratory
Comoros 0 Legislation 46 Coordination 65 Surveillance 22 Response 25 Preparedness 14 Risk communication 50 Human resources 41 Laboratory
Congo 0 Legislation 26 Coordination 37 Surveillance 28 Response 16 Preparedness 43 Risk communication 0 Human resources 71 Laboratory
C?te d'Ivoire 100 Legislation 100 Coordination 100 Surveillance 94 Response 50 Preparedness 100 Risk communication 100 Human resources 100 Laboratory
Democratic Republic of the Congo 50 Legislation 46 Coordination 85 Surveillance 70 Response 60 Preparedness 100 Risk communication 40 Human resources 100 Laboratory
Equatorial Guinea 25 Legislation 20 Coordination 35 Surveillance 55 Response 8 Preparedness 14 Risk communication 60 Human resources 80 Laboratory
Eritrea 50 Legislation 100 Coordination 80 Surveillance 94 Response 45 Preparedness 29 Risk communication 60 Human resources 86 Laboratory
Gambia 25 Legislation 66 Coordination 85 Surveillance 59 Response 63 Preparedness 71 Risk communication 0 Human resources 96 Laboratory
Ghana 75 Legislation 73 Coordination 85 Surveillance 88 Response 51 Preparedness 43 Risk communication 40 Human resources 100 Laboratory
Kenya 50 Legislation 100 Coordination 85 Surveillance 83 Response 53 Preparedness 57 Risk communication 40 Human resources 96 Laboratory
Lesotho 100 Legislation 90 Coordination 65 Surveillance 76 Response 36 Preparedness 86 Risk communication 40 Human resources 96 Laboratory
Madagascar 0 Legislation 36 Coordination 55 Surveillance 34 Response 41 Preparedness 14 Risk communication 40 Human resources 59 Laboratory
Mauritius 75 Legislation 83 Coordination 55 Surveillance 77 Response 20 Preparedness 43 Risk communication 40 Human resources 51 Laboratory
Mozambique 0 Legislation 73 Coordination 90 Surveillance 94 Response 43 Preparedness 43 Risk communication 100 Human resources 39 Laboratory
Niger 100 Legislation 36 Coordination 68 Surveillance 94 Response 80 Preparedness 100 Risk communication 20 Human resources 96 Laboratory
Nigeria 25 Legislation 83 Coordination 75 Surveillance 58 Response 45 Preparedness 57 Risk communication 20 Human resources 61 Laboratory
Rwanda 0 Legislation 16 Coordination 80 Surveillance 72 Response 8 Preparedness 57 Risk communication 40 Human resources 96 Laboratory
Sao Tome and Principe 0 Legislation 46 Coordination 40 Surveillance 28 Response 8 Preparedness 14 Risk communication 0 Human resources 36 Laboratory
Seychelles 0 Legislation 73 Coordination 95 Surveillance 88 Response 8 Preparedness 43 Risk communication 40 Human resources 96 Laboratory
South Africa 75 Legislation 73 Coordination 80 Surveillance 88 Response 83 Preparedness 100 Risk communication 50 Human resources 91 Laboratory
South Sudan 100 Legislation 46 Coordination 75 Surveillance 51 Response 90 Preparedness 71 Risk communication 100 Human resources 29 Laboratory
Swaziland 0 Legislation 36 Coordination 65 Surveillance 71 Response 0 Preparedness 86 Risk communication 60 Human resources 67 Laboratory
Togo 0 Legislation 83 Coordination 90 Surveillance 94 Response 80 Preparedness 0 Risk communication 80 Human resources 67 Laboratory
Uganda 100 Legislation 100 Coordination 80 Surveillance 81 Response 80 Preparedness 100 Risk communication 40 Human resources 100 Laboratory
United Republic of Tanzania 50 Legislation 40 Coordination 75 Surveillance 76 Response 16 Preparedness 57 Risk communication 60 Human resources 69 Laboratory
Zambia 100 Legislation 100 Coordination 95 Surveillance 94 Response 100 Preparedness 100 Risk communication 100 Human resources 100 Laboratory
Average Compliance: 42.74 60.774 73.387 70.65 42.839 56.19 47.1 74.68
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IV. CDC GLOBAL HEALTH PROGRAMS 
The CDC mission statement pledges to work “24/7 to keep Americans safe from 
health threats—whether from the U.S. or abroad, whether from infectious or non-
communicable diseases, or from other causes.”200 The organization carries out its mission 
with three priorities: improving health security at home and around the world; reducing 
the leading causes of illness, injury, disability, and death; and strengthening collaboration 
between public health and healthcare providers.201 As seen from both the mission and 
priorities, the CDC has a global health role. Increasingly, the CDC has sought to increase 
IHR compliance as part of that global health role.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The CDC was derived from a previous organization—the Malaria Control in War 
Areas (MCWA), which operated under the U.S. Public Health Service during WWII. In 
1946, renamed and reestablished as the CDC, the Communicable Disease Center 
expanded efforts to combat all communicable diseases with an emphasis to assist local 
state health departments. The CDC grew in the late 1950s and the 1960s from the 
acquisition of other organizations like the Foreign Quarantine Service and the venereal 
disease program. CDC’s name changed, but not the acronym, to the Center for Disease 
Control in 1970, then to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 1992.202  
From its inception, the CDC expanded to include global efforts for disease 
control. In 1957, the CDC sent staff overseas for the first time to respond to an epidemic 
of cholera and smallpox in Southeast Asia.203 By 1966, the CDC began working with 
                                                 
200 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “2009–2012 Accomplishments CDC: Saving Lives 
and Protecting People,” U.S. Department of Human Health and Services, last modified April 26, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/accomplishments.html.  
201 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Letter from the Director,” last modified August 15, 
2014, http://www.cdc.gov/about/report/2013/director.html.  
202 “Historical Perspectives History of CDC,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) 45, 
no. 20 (1996), 526–530, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042732.htm.  
203 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “CDC: 60 Years of Excellence,” accessed October 7, 
2014, http://www.cdc.gov/about/pdf/resources/timelinefoldout.pdf.  
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USAID to eradicate smallpox and measles globally.204 The Center for Global Health was 
established in 2010, as a division within CDC, to coordinate and execute the CDC global 
health strategy.205  
B. ORGANIZATION 
The CDC serves as one of the eleven operating division under the U.S. 
Department of Human Health and Services.206 The CDC, itself, has numerous Centers, 
Institutes, and Offices (CIOs) under its leadership. Each CIO has a particular specialty or 
expertise that the CDC uses to divide task and responsibilities to deal with health 
concerns.207 The Center for Global Health serves as the lead CIO to deal with global 
health and security and coordinates the activities of the other CIOs when dealing with 
global health issues. Figure 8 illustrates the CIOs that operate under the Director of the 
CDC’s leadership. 
 
                                                 
204 Ibid.  
205 Office of the Director, Center for Global Health, CDC Global Health Strategy: 2012–2015 
(Atlanta: Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012), 3, 
http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/strategy/pdf/CDC-GlobalHealthStrategy.pdf.  
206 “HHS Family of Agencies,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, accessed October 7, 
2014, http://www.hhs.gov/about/foa/index.html.  
207 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “CDC Organization,” U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, last modified April 14, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/cio.htm. 
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Figure 8.  CDC: Organizational Chart208 
The mission of the Center for Global Health is to “protect and improve health 
globally through science, policy, partnership, and evidence-based public health 
action.”209 Through the execution of its mission, the Center for Global Health hopes to 
accomplish four goals globally: improve health impact, enhance health security, increase 
public health capacity, and maximize organizational capacity.210 The center operates in 
over 50 countries and has over 40 staff assigned to international organizations.211 Figure 
9 illustrates where the Center for Global Health operates. 
                                                 
208 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Official 
Chart,” U.S. Department of Human Health and Services, December 16, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/maso/pdf/CDC_Official.pdf.  
209 Office of the Director, Center for Global Health, CDC Global Health Strategy: 2012–2015, 10.  
210 Ibid., 5.  




Figure 9.  CDC: Global Health Activities Map212 
The Center for Global Health has four subordinate divisions: Division of Global 
HIV/AIDS, Division of Parasitic Diseases and Malaria, Global Immunization Division, 
and the Division of Global Health Protection. Figure 10 depicts the organizational 
structure with the divisions and their supporting branches. The Division of Global 
HIV/AIDS provides technical assistance to partner states to implement HIV/AIDS 
prevention, treatment, and care services and systems, which includes enhanced public 
health systems and laboratory services. The Division of Parasitic Disease and Malaria 
carries out activities for the prevention and control of parasitic diseases. The combating 
of vaccine-preventable diseases is carried out by the Global Immunizations Division. 
Finally, the Division of Global Health Protection aims to build public health capacity that 
supports global health security. This support to global health security involves leading 
and coordinating activities with WHO when concerning IHR core capacities 
development.213 
                                                 
212 Ibid.  
213 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Center for Global Health: Mission Statement,” April 
19, 2010, http://www.cdc.gov/maso/pdf/CGHfs.pdf.  
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Figure 10.  Center for Global Health: Organizational Chart214 
C. METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSIS 
An analysis of how CDC global health programs can support or do support IHR 
core capacities will be broken down by strategic goal and their achievements. The lists of 
achievements originate from the CDC’s 2012 Annual Progress Report. By identifying the 
achievements by strategic goal and WHO IHR core capacities, a greater understanding of 
which IHR core capacities are supported or enhanced will be understood.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
The analysis of the CDC’s efforts that align to the IHR core capacities will be 
constrained to those from the Center for Global Health. This limitation exists to limit the 
scope of research, as that particular CIO is responsible for leading and coordinating all 
                                                 
214 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Center for Global Health: Official Chart,” U.S. 
Department of Human Health and Services, November 26, 2013, http://www.cdc.gov/maso/pdf/CGH.pdf. 
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global efforts within the CDC. As acknowledged by CDC, the lists of achievements are 
not all inclusive; however, it will provide a large enough sample of the accomplishments 
within a one year time frame to gain a greater understanding of how the CDC can be 
involved with increasing WHO member state IHR core capacities. Also, the CDC’s 2012 
Annual Progress Report does not breakdown the accomplishments by divisions under the 
Center for Global Health; instead, the achievements are broken down by strategic goal. 
Multiple divisions and branches are involved with the activities under each strategic goal.  
E. GOALS, FUNDING, AND ANALYSIS 
The activities selected in this section represent the achievements accomplished by 
the CDC’s Center for Global Health that either support or align to building IHR core 
capacities abroad. These achievements are divided by CDC’s global health strategic goals 
and not by organizational structure; furthermore, the budget requested in FY2015 for the 
Center for Global Health does not directly align programs to the global health strategy. 
Instead, the budget reflects the organizational structure for the Center for Global Health, 
and specific efforts within each division must fit within the greater strategy. Table 17 




Table 17.   CDC Global Health Budget: FY2015215 
The FY2015 CBJ outlines four budgeted program areas: global HIV/AIDS, global 
immunizations, parasitic diseases and malaria, and global public health protection. The 
budget for the Center for Global Health has increased from its inception in 2010 by over 
$100 million. The budget requested in FY2015 increased by $47.5 million from the 
previous year, with the largest increase going towards global public health protection 
activities. While the largest portion of the budget goes towards global immunizations, 
global public health protection has increased its overall share of the budget by six percent 
since FY2013.216  
The new global public health protection activities will support the new Global 
Health Security Agenda launched on February 13, 2014.217 Based on the Global Health 
Security Agenda, the U.S. committed to working with a minimum of 30 partner countries 
                                                 
215 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], FY2015 CDC Justification of Estimates 
for Appropriation Committees, 284, http://www.cdc.gov/fmo/topic/Budget%20Information/index.html.  
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid., 298. 
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to advance their health systems in order to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious 
diseases in accordance with IHR.218 More specifically, the  
CDC will partner with up to ten countries to create sustainable programs 
that increase leadership capacity and provide the resources necessary to 
manage emerging threats, enhance early detection, improve confirmation, 
and ensure highly effective responses to global epidemics and other public 
health catastrophes.219 
While the expansion in global health security will increase the support activities 
aligned with IHR core capacities, many of the achievements accomplished in 2012 
clearly align. These aligned achievements prescribe to three of the four strategic goals of 
the CDC global health strategy: health impact, health security, and health capacity. It 
appears that the organizational divisions and program budgets for Global Health 
Protection and Global HIV/AIDS execute the preponderance of these aligned activities.  
1. Health Impact 
Improved health impact involves all activities that aim to directly improve the 
health and wellbeing of individuals abroad.220 The strategic goal encompasses eight lines 
of effort that involve all divisions under the Center for Global Health. It appears that all 
four divisions have supporting lines of effort and achievements. The lines of effort, the 
aligned achievements, and the supported IHR core capacities under the health impact 
strategic goal are shown in Table 18. As seen in Table 18, health impact most aligns with 
the IHR response core capacity. 
 
                                                 
218 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “US Commitment to the Global Health Security 
Agenda: Toward a World Safe and Secure from Infectious Disease Threats,” The Global Health Security 
Agenda, accessed June 9, 2014, http://www.globalhealth.gov/global-health-topics/global-health-
security/ghsagenda.html. 
219 HHS, FY2015 CDC Justification, 299.  
220 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], CDC Global Health Strategy (2012–2015): 




Table 18.   CDC: Health Impact Goals Aligned to IHR Core Capacities221 
                                                 
221 CDC, CDC Global Health Strategy (2012–2015): 2012 Annual Progress Report, 3–18; WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26–55. 
Achievements under supporting Lines of Effort Core Capacity (component) Core Capacity (component)
Provided leadership for costing and modeling of treatment scale-up and implementation of the Track 1.0 Antiretroviral Treatment (ART) program, including transitioning programs to 
local partners in all 13 Track 1.0 ART countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Preparedness- Risk and Resource Management Response- Case Management
Provided leadership, technical assistance, and support in the implementation and monitoring of Option B+, an innovative strategy to prevent mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of 
HIV and improve mothers’ health.  The number of pregnant and breastfeeding women started on antiretroviral therapy through Option B+ in Malawi totaled 10,663, an increase of 
748%. Preparedness- Risk and Resource Management Response-Case Management
Worked with 45 Ministries of Health to build their technical and operational capacity for leading and sustaining their national responses. CDC’s approach is to carefully transition 
programmatic and financial responsibilities to host governments and local partners over time. National Legislation- Policy and Financing
Coordination and NFP Communication- IHR 
Coordination, Communication and Advocacy
Assisted more than 30 Ministries of Health in evaluating and strengthening national TB programs and TB/HIV surveillance systems, and led development of global standards for 
monitoring and evaluation through the WHO Global Task Force on TB Impact Measurement. 
Coordination and NFP Communication- IHR Coordination, 
Communication and Advocacy Surveillance- Event Based Surveillance
Trained laboratorians from 27 countries in TB diagnostics and strengthened laboratory management systems in eight countries in accordance with WHO, CDC, and regional standards 
to help national laboratories achieve accreditation.
Laboratory- Diagnostic and Confirmation Capacity/Policy and 
Coordination of Laboratory Services
Led a study in nine countries to describe increased drug-resistant TB occurs, which informed WHO’s New Global Framework, a re-envisioning of how WHO supports countries in 
achieving high quality drug-resistant TB programs. Response- Infection Control
Developed a TB infection control training and implementation package for use in HIV clinics, which is being rolled out widely in high HIV burden settings. Response- Infection Control
Established regional Centers of Excellence for infection control in Eastern Europe and East Africa and has assisted 16 countries in developing and implementing TB infection control 
guidelines. Response- Infection Control
1.3: Reduce Malaria Morbidity and Mortality
Provided technical guidance to program the procurement and distribution of 32 million insecticide-treated bed nets, 29 million malaria rapid diagnostic tests, and 73 million doses of 
antimalarial combination treatment in PMI focus countries.  Also, conducted global product testing to ensure that donors and malaria control programs can procure quality diagnostic 
tests. Response- Disinfection, Decontamination and Vector Control
Preparedness-Risk and Resource 
management for IHR Preparedness
Protected 30 million people from malaria through indoor residual insecticide spraying. Response- Disinfection, Decontamination and Vector Control
Provided direct technical assistance to vector control programs in 19 PMI focus countries as well as endemic countries in Latin America and the Greater Mekong Subregion. Response- Disinfection, Decontamination and Vector Control
Provided training to 12 visiting scientists from endemic countries, 3 Epidemic Intelligence Service Officers, and 2 Association of Schools of Public Health Fellows. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Provided support to the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Malaria in Pregnancy working group which works with eight priority sub-Saharan countries to develop and implement country action 
plans to improve uptake of IPTp. Response- Case Management
1.5: Reduce Child Morbidity and Mortality
Conducted or supported surveillance for influenza in more than 45 countries, including 10 countries that set up procedures for real-time testing for multiple respiratory pathogens. Surveillance- Indicator and Event-Based Surveillance
Completed the first round of Mass Drug Administration (MDA) in Haiti, reaching 2.3 million people, helping Haiti achieve nationwide coverage of MDA for lymphatic filariasis for the 
first time. The MDA was followed by an intensive CDC-supported evaluation to assess coverage, which found that additional emphasis needed to be put on social mobilization to 
ensure high participation rates. Response- Disinfection, Decontamination and Vector Control
Engaged in successful efforts to strengthen the capacity of health systems to deliver routine immunization services in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Nigeria, 
South Sudan, and Uganda. Preparedness- Risk and Resource Management
Organized, through the Surveillance en Afrique Centrale (SURVAC) project, workshops to build national capacity and to reinforce sentinel surveillance for bacterial meningitis and 
rotavirus gastroenteritis. Surveillance- Indicator Based Surveillance
Conducted surveillance activities to monitor the impact of MenAfriVac, an initiative covering many countries in sub-Saharan Africa’s meningitis belt. Surveillance- Indicator Based Surveillance
Developed and piloted 24 training modules on NCD topics for the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP), which were used in workshops in China, Thailand, Colombia, Jordan, 
and Tanzania. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
1.7: Control, Eliminate, or Eradicate Vaccine-Preventable Diseases
1.8: Reduce Burden of Non-Communicable Diseases
Goal 1: Health Impact
1.2: Reduce Tuberculosis Morbidity and Mortality
1.1: Prevent New Infections and Serve the Needs of HIV Positive Individuals Globally
1.4: Reduce Maternal and Perinatal Mortality
1.6: Eliminate and Control Targeted Neglected Tropical Diseases
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2. Health Security 
Health security encompasses the efforts of CDC working with partnered states 
and organizations to improve the ability of states “to prepare for and respond to disease 
threats on a global scale.”222 In 2012 alone, CDC partnered with 81 states to improve 
global health security. Activities included supporting Emergency Operation Centers 
(EOC) development, disease detection, and outbreak response.223 It appears that the 
Division of Global Health Protection through its programed budget for global public 
health protection executes the preponderance of achievements aligned with IHR core 
capacities—more specifically the Global Disease Detection Branch. Based on the 
achievements outlined in 2012, the goal for enhanced health security best supports the 
response IHR core capacity. Not surprisingly, these achievements that align to response 
are predominantly under the line of effort—2.2 Response to International Public Health 
Emergencies and Improve Country Response Capabilities. The lines of effort, the aligned 
achievements, and the supported IHR core capacities under the health security strategic 
goal are shown in Table 19.  
                                                 
222 CDC, CDC Global Health Strategy (2012–2015): 2012 Annual Progress Report, 2.  
223 Ibid.  
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Table 19.   CDC: Health Security Goals Aligned to IHR Core Capacities224 
3. Public Health Capacity 
The goal to increase public health capacity involves working with partnered states 
to build, strengthen, and maintain the capacity to improve health impact for their own 
citizens. CDC primarily accomplishes this goal by assisting partnered states National 
Public Health Institutes, building workforce capacity through the Field Epidemiology 
                                                 
224 CDC, CDC Global Health Strategy (2012–2015): 2012 Annual Progress Report, 19–22; WHO, 
“IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26-55. 
Achievements under supporting Lines of Effort Core Capacity (component) Core Capacity (component)
Provided support to more than 20 countries to support Emergency Operations Center (EOC) development, 
exercise development and training in emergency operations, incident command systems, and emergency 
risk communications. Response- Rapid Response 
Capacity





Identified 122 new outbreaks via event-based surveillance and supported cross-agency Epi-Aids to 19 
outbreaks in 16 countries in 2012, through the Global Disease Detection Operations Center.
Surveillance-Event Based 
Surveillance





Worked to improve the capacity of laboratories worldwide to detect unusual pathogens by improving their 
capacity to accurately identify their endemic pathogens. Efforts in 2012 supported laboratories in Armenia, 




Built lab capacity, in Uganda, to identify viral hemorrhagic and vector-borne viruses and plague.  In 









Partnered with the Ministry of Health, in Haiti, and the International Centre for Diarrheal Disease Research 
(Bangladesh) to train more than 500 clinical staff on the clinical management of cholera.
Response- Case 
Management
Worked in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Thailand, 
Uganda, and Ukraine to improve methods to detect and prevent emerging pathogens that result from social 
and demographic trends that increase human contact with animals, vectors, and poor sanitation.
Preparedness- Risk and 
Resource Management
Response- Disinfection, 
Decontamination, and Vector 
Control
Supported the 2012 establishment of the Zoonotic Disease Unit (ZDU) in Kenya, which successfully 
responded to an outbreak of Human African Trypanosomiasis, and established the burden of zoonotic 
bacteria as causes of chronic heart disease in Thailand. (IHR Hazard- Zoonotic events)
Provided assistance in responding to 209 outbreaks through the Global Disease Detection Centers 
worldwide; of these, 140 (67%) were responded to in less than 24 hours.
Response- Rapid Response 
Capacity
Deployed staff to Georgia to strengthen anthrax disease surveillance, identify risk factors, and improve 
health education. 
Risk Communication- Policy 
and Procedures for Public 
Communications Surveillance- Indicator Based
Responded to outbreaks of cholera in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone, strengthening 
disease surveillance in DRC neighborhoods affected by munitions explosions and in sites for internally 
displaced persons.
Response- Rapid Response 
Capacity
Investigating an increase in gastroenteritis-associated deaths among children under five in Botswana.
Response- Rapid Response 
Capacity
Provided support for laboratory capacity development in response to outbreaks of Ebola in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Uganda.
Response- Rapid Response 
Capacity
Laboratory- Laboratory 
Diagnostic and Confirmation 
Capacity
Supported the first international conference on nodding syndrome in conjunction with outbreak responses 





Assisted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the investigation of the first identified novel coronavirus case, the 
virus was later named Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV).
Response- Rapid Response 
Capacity
2.1: Strengthen Capacity to Prepare for and Detect Infectious Diseases and Other Emerging Health Threats
2.2: Respond to International Public Health Emergencies and Improve Country Response Capabilities
Goal 2: Health Security
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Training Program (FETP), and strengthening the laboratory capacity and capability 
globally.225 Human resources and laboratory are the most supported IHR core capacity 
under this strategic goal. While it appears that the Division for Global Health Protection 
and Global HIV/AIDS are involved with the majority of achievements, the FETP in 
particular is attributable for the preponderance of human resource achievements. This 
program operates under the Division for Global Health Protection. Table 20 shows the 
lines of effort, the aligned achievements, and the supported IHR core capacities under the 
public health capacity strategic goal.  
                                                 
225 CDC, CDC Global Health Strategy (2012–2015): 2012 Annual Progress Report, 2. 
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Table 20.   CDC: Health Capacity Goals Aligned to IHR Core Capacities226 
                                                 
226 CDC, CDC Global Health Strategy (2012–2015): 2012 Annual Progress Report, 23–31; WHO, 
“IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 26-55. 
Achievements under supporting Lines of Effort Core Capacity (component)
Supported Rwanda’s Institute for HIV/AIDS, Disease Prevention and Control to strengthen organizational 
performance.
Coordination and NFP Communications- IHR 
Coordination, Communication, and Advocacy
Strengthened the Public Health Institute of Malawi.
Coordination and NFP Communications- IHR 
Coordination, Communication, and Advocacy
Supported India’s National Center for Disease Control in its efforts to streamline public health data 
collection and to improve scientific reporting.
Coordination and NFP Communications- IHR 
Coordination, Communication, and Advocacy
Supported the government of Kenya establishing a One Health (OH) office to bridge the ministries of 
livestock and human health.
Coordination and NFP Communications- IHR 
Coordination, Communication, and Advocacy (IHR 
Hazard- Zoonotic Events)
Supported the development of country capacity to implement the International Health Regulations (2005), 
which includes disease surveillance and dissemination of surveillance information. In 2012, 28 (61%) of 46 
African countries reported regular dissemination of surveillance feedback bulletins. Eight (28%) of these 
countries include district-level information in their dissemination. Surveillance- Indicator Based
Supported the establishment of two new training programs—India’s Epidemic Intelligence Service and 
Yemen’s FETP. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Supported 25 FETPs with 229 graduates. FETP residents in programs conducted 408 outbreak investigations, 
planned 190 studies, engaged in 447 surveillance activities, and presented 156 presentations at national 
and international public health conferences. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Supported short epidemiology training courses in Haiti, Laos, Cambodia, and South Sudan. In 2012, these 
programs supported 64 trainees and 24 graduates. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Supported preservice training for 8,742 health care workers in support of the President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Collaborated with WHO and the Nigerian Federal MOH, as part of PEPFAR, to launch a national human 
resource information system and a registry of the national health workforce. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Implemented, as part of PEPFAR, a four-year initiative to improve HIV service delivery by strengthening 
nursing and midwifery leadership, policy, and regulation. The African Health Professions Regulatory 
Collaborative is a south-to-south learning collaborative that convenes nursing leadership teams from 
MOHs, regulatory bodies, professional associations, and academic sectors to build the nursing workforce in 
17 countries in east, central, and southern Africa. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Provided training opportunities to CDC’s HIV/AIDS prevention research teams in Botswana, Kenya, and 
Thailand which allows them to find new opportunities for work in the healthcare systems of their 
respective countries following the completion of the CDC studies. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Established a One Health fellowship for graduating veterinarian epidemiologists, as part of FETP, which 
graduated its first class in 2012, including six health professionals from Kenya and Uganda. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Trained and selected FETP residents to form a Stop Transmission of Polio (STOP) team to support the 
country’s 2012 polio eradication emergency plan. Response-Rapid Response Capacity
Supported the formation of the African Society for Laboratory Medicine (ASLM), as part of PEPFAR. ASLM 
aspires to increase the visibility and professional integrity of laboratories on the African continent. CDC 
works with ASLM on the development of national laboratory strategic plans and supports advocacy for 
regional laboratory accreditation bodies on the continent. 
Laboratory- Policy and Coordination of Laboratory 
Services/Laboratory Diagnostic and Confirmation 
Capacity
Devised the Stepwise Laboratory Management towards Accreditation Training Program resulting in 
significant improvement of workforce performance in support of global HIV/AIDS and other public health 
programs.
Laboratory- Laboratory Diagnostic and Confirmation 
Capacity/Laboratory Based Surveillance
Continued to provide short, practical laboratory courses (five days or more) both in Atlanta and overseas to 
improve laboratory workforce capacity, and to encourage ministries of health to establish leadership 
positions for ministry laboratory programs. Human Resources- Human Resource Capacity
Developed innovative assays for public health surveillance and laboratory diagnosis of a broad range of 
infectious diseases found in resource poor settings, including Taqman Array Cards for respiratory and 
febrile illnesses, HIV incidence assays, and point-of-care tests for cryptococcal meningitis and syphilis. 
Laboratory- Laboratory Diagnostic and Confirmation 
Capacity
Continued to maintain and expand global laboratory networks supporting vaccine preventable disease 
programs for polio, measles, rubella, rotavirus, influenza, and invasive bacterial infections to improve 
disease surveillance.
Laboratory- Laboratory Diagnostic and Confirmation 
Capacity/Laboratory Based Surveillance
Worked with ASLM and WHO/AFRO to develop the Stepwise Laboratory Improvement Process Towards 
Accreditation checklist to measure quality improvement in African laboratories while reducing the cost of 
formal accreditation preparedness. This approach has been modified and implemented in Central America, 
the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia.
Laboratory- Laboratory Diagnostic and Confirmation 
Capacity
Worked with WHO and Department of Defense to introduce laboratory quality management systems in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, and with the Global Laboratory Initiative to design a program to improve the 
quality of national tuberculosis reference laboratories. 
Laboratory- Laboratory Diagnostic and Confirmation 
Capacity/Laboratory Based Surveillance
Goal 3: Health Capacity
3.1: Strengthen Public Health Institutions and Infrastructure
3.2: Improve Surveillance and the Use of Strategic Information
3.3: Build Workforce Capacity
3.4: Strengthen Laboratory Systems and Networks
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4. Organizational Capacity 
CDC’s strategic goal of maximizing organizational capacity aims to increase the 
efficacy of CDC global programs. This goal is achieved through strengthening and 
integrating the organizational and technical capacity for global health activities, as well 
as increasing communication to internal and external stakeholders.227 None of the 
achievements outlined in the 2012 Annual Progress Report align to IHR core capacities, 
but it could be stated that these efforts support the greater global strategy.  
F. HOW TO USE THE DATA 
In 2012, the accomplishments executed and coordinated by the Center for Global 
Health mainly align to three IHR core capacities: response, laboratory, and human 
resources. The Global Health Protection and Global HIV/AIDS branches, which together 
account for 50 percent of the global health budget, carry out the vast majority of these 
aligned achievements. The analysis did not closely dissect where these global health 
activities take place or their impact, but Figure 9 illustrates that CDC conducts most of its 
activities in Africa, Asia, and South America.  
Among the IHR core capacities, Table 21 confirms that WHO member states are 
most compliant in surveillance, response, and laboratory core capacities, however, human 
resources ranks last.  
                                                 
227 CDC, CDC Global Health Strategy (2012–2015): 2012 Annual Progress Report, 2. 
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Table 21.   Global IHR Compliance Averages: 2013228  
This indicates the human resource building activities and programs carried out by 
CDC as extremely valuable. No other agency has as many supported human resource 
activities. This should not undermine efforts that build response and laboratory capability 
and capacity abroad. Instead, it provides further evidence that laboratory and response 
building efforts are working, and these efforts should be better focused to states 
noncompliant in those capacities. The GDDER program, with a budget over $45 million, 
executed the majority of these response and laboratory achievements (see Table 17).  
The efficacy of the human resource aligned programs can be analyzed with 
regards to FETP. Table 22 shows where current FETP state programs operate, which 
have reported graduates.  
                                                 
228 WHO, “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring Framework: All Capacities Data by 
Country.” 
Ranking IHR Compliance Average IHR Core Capacity
1 61.63 Human resources
2 64.79 Preparedness
3 72.50 Legislation







Table 22.   CDC Supported FETP with Recorded Graduates: Human Resource 
Core Capacity Analysis229 
The table reveals that the majority of states with FETP have human resource 
compliance rates much higher than regional and global averages. As stated by the 
IHR”IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” one of the inputs and processes to 
develop human resources is “a plan or strategy developed for the country to access field 
epidemiology training.”230 FETP helps accomplish this task. In order to further bolster 
human resource capacity globally, the FETP should be increased to states that lack a 
human resources plan or are noncompliant with the IHR. Any expansion of FETP would 
require an increase in budget to the global public health capacity development program 
(see Table 17).  
 
                                                 
229 WHO, “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring Framework: All Capacities Data by 
Country;” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “FETP—About,” Protection, last modified March 
13, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/fetp/about.html.  
230 WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 39. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The United States has numerous programs, agencies, and organizations involved 
in global health; yet, most of these do not declare IHR compliance as a core mission. 
While, many critics of the U.S. global health programs argue that the programs stovepipe 
issues into single categories such as HIV/AIDS; this thesis presents numerous cross-
cutting efforts exist that can serve in the interest of both global health programs and IHR 
compliance. With the majority of WHO member states failing to achieve IHR compliance 
and the increasing public concern over infectious diseases, due to outbreaks like Ebola, 
the U.S. global health programs must remain relevant to IHR and global health security.  
A report by the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, U.S. Global Health Policy: Mapping 
the United States Government Engagement in Global Public Health, argues that there has 
been absence of a coordinated U.S. government global health strategy during a time of 
accelerated global health spending.231 Through the current related and possible IHR 
capacity building efforts, a common operating picture can be realized. Then a strategy 
can be formulated by matching resources against needs to increase IHR compliance.  
This chapter aims to connect the aggregated data to present how the U.S. global 
health programs can be leveraged to assist partner state with IHR compliance needs. It 
will also identify organizations not analyzed for this thesis, which may have an increasing 
role for further research. Lastly, a recommendation will be made on how to increase 
partner states’ IHR compliance through a greater understanding of the current programs 
and agencies’ strengthens and weaknesses. 
A. AGGREGATING THE DATA 
Aggregating the U.S. global health programs that align with the IHR core 
capacities identifies which specific core capacities are being supported and by what 
agency. It also helps identify unsupported core capacities. Decision makers can then 
                                                 
231 Fischer, Lief, Seegobin, and Kates, U.S. Global Health Policy, 17. 
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formulate strategies to match strengths against needs and identify solutions unsupported 
core capacity development.    
1. Areas of Strength 
Across agencies, the core capacities most supported by U.S. efforts appear to be 
surveillance, laboratory, and response. Interestingly, these three core capacities rank 
highest in WHO member state compliance (see Table 21). While the efficacy of each 
program was not analyzed, U.S. efforts do appear to correlate to higher IHR core capacity 
compliance rates, as compared to regional averages. This inference is made in Table 7 
and Table 22. This discovery may also simply denote that U.S. programs and 
organizations have the same priorities as other states. Even though USAID, DOD, and 
CDC all have efforts in these three core capacities, DOD and CDC appear to have 
programs that focus on specific core capacities. DOD focuses on surveillance with the 
AFHSC-GEIS and laboratory through CBEP, while CDC is primarily engaged with 
activities related to response core capacities through GDDER. 
a. USAID 
Analysis of the FY2014, Users Guide to USAID/Washington Health Programs, 
provided in Chapter II and seen in Table 23, reveals that the projects aligned to IHR core 
capacities are well balanced among risk communication, surveillance, response, 
preparedness, and laboratory. Over 50 percent of the aligned projects originate from the 
global health programs aimed at protecting communities from infectious diseases; even 
though, these projects only account for 12 percent of the USAID global health program 
budget for FY2014.232  
                                                 
232 “Budget Tracker: Status of U.S. FY14 Funding for Key Global Health Related Accounts,” The 
Henry J. Kaiser Foundation. 
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Table 23.   USAID: Aggregated Data of IHR Aligned Projects 
Furthermore, the PIOET projects—Identify, Predict, Respond, Prevent, and 
Deliver—account for 19 percent of the USAID projects relevant to IHR core capacities 
(see Table 4). This does not include the IHR hazard for zoonotic events. The budget for 
PIOET in FY2014 was only $47 million, less than two-percent of the global health 
programs under USAID.233  
Surprisingly, the global health programs that support Tuberculosis prevention and 
care account for the greatest proportion of IHR aligned USAID projects (see Table 4). 
Four USAID Tuberculosis projects account for 28 percent of the total USAID aligned 
core capacities (see Table 4). This high percentage is largely attributable to the USAID 
projects executing the WHO-recommended STOP TB Strategy, which entails multiple 
objectives that align against IHR core capacities. The budget for these programs in 
FY2014 amounted to $191 million—seven-percent of the USAID global health 
budget.234  
b. DOD 
The DOD is heavily engaged in surveillance and laboratory-aligned global health 
activities. AFHSC-GEIS accounts for the disproportionate amount of surveillance 
                                                 
233 “Budget Tracker: Status of U.S. FY14 Funding for Key Global Health Related Accounts,” The 










from  Infectious 
Diseases Other Total
Percentage of Total 
(Rounded to nearest 
whole number)
National Legislation 1 0 1 1 3 5%
Coordination and NFP Communication 0 0 2 1 3 5%
Surveillance 2 1 5 2 10 17%
Response 3 0 5 1 9 16%
Preparedness 3 1 3 2 9 16%
Human Resources 3 0 1 1 5 9%
Risk Communication 3 0 7 1 11 19%
Laboratory 1 0 6 1 8 14%
Number of Aligned Projects in Each Program Area 16 2 30 10 58
USAID Lines of Effort
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activities, while CBEP carries out majority of those related to laboratory. DHAPP and 
MHRP support both of these to include response and risk communication; however, these 
additional capacities are not greatly represented with AFHSC-GEIS and CBEP.  
Table 24 presents the aggregated data for the 2012 AFHSC-GEIS achievements 
that correspond to the IHR core capacities. In 2013, GEIS distributed $45.6 million to 
support these activities.235 The budget is very comparable to the USAID PIOET program. 
True to its name, AFHSC-GEIS most corresponds with surveillance and response core 
capacities.  
 
Table 24.   AFHSC-GEIS: Aggregated Data of IHR Aligned Achievements 
DHAPP and MHRP relate to the core capacities for surveillance, response, 
laboratory, and risk communication, but the programs are constrained to assist HIV/AIDS 
prevention, care, and treatment of partnered states’ service members and their families. 
As seen in Table 12 and 14, the programs still accomplish a large number of 
achievements in each capacity.    
The CBEP greatly aligns to building laboratory core capacity. With an annual 
budget of $260 million, CBEP has a great potential to increase laboratory capacity in 
partnered states.236 The program has less diversity in terms of other core capacities, with 
                                                 
235 Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center: Health 
Surveillance, Analysis, and Insight for Action (Silver Springs, MD: AFHSC, 2013/2014), 22, 
http://www.afhsc.mil/documents/pubs/documents/AFHSC_AnnualReport_WEB.pdf. 
236 DTRA, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Estimates, CTR-1153. 
Core Capacity Total Number of Aligned Achievements
Percentage (Rounded to 
Nearest Whole Number)
National Legislation 0 0%




Human Resources 8 12%





surveillance being the only other capacity greatly supported. Table 25 displays the 
aggregated data for CBEP.  
 
Table 25.   CBEP: Aggregated Data of IHR Aligned Projects 
c. CDC 
The CDC’s achievements in 2012 most aligned to response, human resources, and 
laboratory core capacities. This is most likely due to GDDER and FETP. With an annual 
budget around $45 million, GDDER has assisted in 1,257 outbreak responses since its 
inception in 2006.237 Also, FETP produced 2,800 public health work graduates since its 
inception in 1980; currently the program has an annual budget of less than $10 million.238 
Table 26 presents the aggregated IHR aligned core capacity achievements for the CDC in 
2012.    
                                                 
237 HHS, FY2015 CDC Justification of Estimates for Appropriation Committees, 284; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, “Global Disease Detection Detecting and Containing Health Threats,” 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, last modified December 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/pdf/factsheet_globaldiseasedetection.pdf. 
238 HHS, FY2015 CDC Justification of Estimates for Appropriation Committees, 284. 
Core Capacity Total Number of Aligned Projects Percentage
National Legislation 0 0%




Human Resources 1 3.3%






Table 26.   CDC: Aggregated Data of IHR Aligned Achievements 
2. Areas of Weakness 
As evident in Tables 23–26, the analyzed U.S. global health programs and 
organizations carry out few activities relevant to national legislation, policy, and 
financing. U.S. global health programs appear to be involved in all other core capacities 
albeit at varying degrees. Perhaps, more beneficial than understanding U.S. global health 
program core capacity weaknesses is identification of the global needs. 
B. WHAT IS NEEDED? 
Previously, Table 21 identified the consolidated compliance rates in 2013, for 
each IHR core capacity. Human resources, preparedness, and national legislation ranked 
last respectively; however, these results do not reflect the regional variances in 
compliance. For example, WHO-European Region had only a 53 percent compliance rate 
in human resources, while the other seven core capacities had rates of 75 percent or 
above for 2013. WHO-Africa Region accounted for only a 43 percent compliance rate in 
national legislation, whereas, laboratory and surveillance were both more than 70 percent. 
Furthermore, 21.1 percent of WHO member states failed to report 2013 compliance rates; 
most surprising, 43.3 percent of the WHO-European Region state members failed to 
report. Table 27 better illustrates both the weaknesses and reporting statuses for each 









National Legislation 1 0 0 1 1.5%
Coordination and NFP Communication 2 1 4 7 10.8%
Surveillance 4 2 1 7 10.8%
Response 10 9 1 20 30.8%
Preparedness 4 3 0 7 10.8%
Human Resources 2 0 9 11 16.9%
Risk Communication 0 1 0 1 1.5%
Laboratory 1 4 6 11 16.9%
Total 24 20 21 65
Strategic Goal
Total Percentage of Total
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Table 27.   Lowest WHO Regional Core Capacities and Reporting Statuses239 
C. WHAT IS MISSING? 
This thesis examined the activities for three government agencies based on the 
scale and scope of each’s contributions to global health. Further research would examine 
the other agencies, offices, and institutes involved in global health, which could possibly 
facilitate global IHR compliance. This includes HHS-Office for Global Affairs and DOS-
Office of Global Health Diplomacy. 
1. Office of Global Affairs  
OGA advances HHS’s global strategies and partnerships, while serving as the 
point of coordination for global health policy, security and initiatives within the U.S. 
government. With an annual budget of $6.270 million and 22 full-time equivalent (FTE) 
employees, OGA is relatively small compared to the other U.S. organizations involved in 
global health. OGA, however, due to its position within the Office of the Secretary, 
serves as lead within HHS for setting priorities for international engagements. For 
FY2014, OGA awarded four grants, but these went to largely address health outcomes on 
the U.S.-Mexico border and don’t relate to IHR core capacities.240 
2. Office of Global Health Diplomacy  
Through diplomacy, S/GHD aims “to improve and save lives and foster 
sustainability through a shared global responsibility.”241 S/GHD primarily focuses on 
providing diplomatic support in implementing GHI principles and goals, while operating 
                                                 
239 WHO, “International Health Regulations (2005) Monitoring Framework: All Capacities Data by 
Country.” 
240 HHS, FY 2015 CDC Justification of Estimates for Appropriation Committees, 45-47. 
241 U.S. Department of State, “Office of Global Health Diplomacy,” Bureaus/Offices Reporting 
Directly to the Secretary, accessed on November 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/s/ghd/index.htm. 
WHO-Region Compliance Average (%) Core Capacity Compliance Average (%) Core Capacity Reporting Average (%)
European 53.33 Human Resources 75 Preparedness 56.7
Americas 67.09 Preparedness 68.13 Human Resources 91.5
Africa 42.74 Legislation 42.84 Preparedness 70.3
Eastern Mediterranean 62.24 Preparedness 66.67 Risk Communication 100
Western Pacific 71.92 Human Resources 78.19 Preparedness 96.3
South-East Asia 69.09 Human Resources 69.27 Preparedness 100
Lowest Regional Core Capacity Second Lowest Regional Core Capacity
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as an organization within the Office of the Secretary. S/GHD employees 12 staff 
members divided into two teams: Sustainability and Shared Responsibility and 
Institutionalizing Health Diplomacy. Sustainability and Shared Responsibility focuses on 
external engagements such as those with donors, NGOs, and IGOs, while 
Institutionalizing Health Diplomacy focuses on internal engagements. These internal 
engagements aim to provide increased knowledge to U.S. diplomats on global health 
issues and assistance.242 
D. THE NEXT STEP 
This thesis seeks to answer how U.S. global health programs can assist WHO 
member states through a greater understanding of current assistance by agency. For a 
coherent strategy, WHO member states must first be able to monitor and report their IHR 
compliance in each core capacity. This information is critical for identify state needs. 
Next, decision makers can utilize specific current U.S. global health programs to address 
WHO member states’ deficiencies in surveillance, response, laboratory, and human 
resources. Finally, there must be a solution to address IHR core capacity gaps in human 
resources, preparedness, and national legislation—the core capacities most needed.  
1. Monitoring and Reporting IHR Compliance 
The monitoring and reporting status for IHR compliance varies greatly by region. 
Europe and Africa both have poor reporting statuses, as compared to the other regions 
(see Table 27). Monitoring efforts are a critical first step for states recognizing their own 
needs and requirements. As outlined in Article 54 of IHR, both WHO and state members 
are required to report to the World Health Assembly on an annual basis regarding 
compliance and implementation of IHR.243 Diplomatic efforts should be levied against 
European states failing to report IHR compliance, as this threatens the legitimacy of the 
IHR. It is unclear whether GHA or S/GHD should lead this effort. Options in Africa also 
                                                 
242 Sheila Weir, “A Healthier World: Office Strengthens Global Health Diplomacy,” Slate Magazine, 
January 2014, 18–19. 
243 WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 11. 
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include diplomacy, withholding of future global health aid, and creating new global 
health projects to monitor compliance.   
2. Programs of Excellence/Collaborating Centers 
As presented in this thesis, individual U.S. global health programs are adept in 
particular core capacities. These should become programs of excellence or collaborating 
centers for IHR compliance. Table 28 lists these programs. 
  
Table 28.   Programs of Excellence 
This emphasis does not lessen the importance of other global health programs, but instead 
provides greater clarity to decision makers when trying to address global IHR 
compliance. It also identifies current programs that could be used to increase specific 
IHR core capacities, instead of creating parallel programs or organizations. 
 These programs of excellence should become programs of choice for decision 
makers seeking to increase IHR compliance in those four core capacities. As an example, 
in Africa region, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea both have surveillance 
rates less than 40 percent. This would provide an opportunity for AFHSC-GEIS to serve 
a key role for increasing compliance rates in those states.    
3. Renewed Focus 
Across the spectrum U.S. global health programs are focused in three areas with 
regards to IHR core capacities: surveillance, response, and laboratory. Analysis, however, 
indicates the three core capacities most deficient are human resources, preparedness, and 
national legislation. Decision makers must address this gap between current programs 
and global needs.  
Program Core Capacity Program Core Capacity
AFHSC-GEIS Surveillance GDDER Response
CBEP Laboratory FETP Human Resources
DOD CDC
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a. Human Resources 
Human resources could be bolstered by identify FETP as a program of excellence 
and expanding its efforts. The budget for FETP remains minute compared to the 
preponderance of other health programs. As illustrated in Table 22, states partnered with 
FETP, on average, have higher human resource compliance rates compared to their 
regional average. Regional FETP can be best leveraged to include smaller states. Many of 
the deficient WHO member states in the Americas and Western Pacific are small island 
states that could benefit most from regional programs.  
b. Preparedness 
Aggregated, no specific agency or program analyzed greatly aligns to 
preparedness; nonetheless, all of the agencies had some activities aligned to 
preparedness. These activities mostly involved mapping potential health risks and 
improving the supply chains within partnered states. As seen in Figure 11, preparedness 




Figure 11.  Preparedness: Recommended Checklist for Monitoring Progress of IHR 
Core Capacity Development244 
To address these requirements, each U.S. agency must leverage preexisting 
strengths. USAID has multiple projects involved in improving supply chain management 
                                                 
244 WHO, “IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework,” 36–37. 
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and health care logistics. Improving and incorporating these distribution channels and 
efforts into national response plans would assist compliance efforts. Under its strategic 
goal for Research, Innovation, and Integration, AFHSC-GEIS has shown an ability to 
develop products for mapping health risks. Lastly, DOD exercises can be developed to 
test national public health response plans. The exercises could be planned by DTRA, 
under the regional COCOM. Furthermore, these can be as simple as tabletop exercises to 
provide a greater understanding to decision makers of the resources available against 
known health risks. These resources also include U.S. and international response 
assistance if deemed necessary.   
c. National Legislation, Policy, and Financing 
As a core capacity, national legislation has the third lowest compliance rate 
globally and the lowest in Africa. It is possible that other organizations such as the OGA 
or S/GHD address the core capacity for IHR national legislation compliance; however, 
out of the agencies analyzed this core capacity was the most underrepresented. Perhaps 
the organization most suited to address this core capacity is S/GHD. A key element 
would be to secure funding for NFP functions in partnered states. This funding could 
support a national public health institute or center for disease control in partnered states 
with a tiered approach for partner states to assume financing responsibilities with a goal 
of sustainability.   
Other possibilities for increasing national legislation would be to increase the few 
existing efforts. Examples from USAID include the Health Policy Project and Health 
Finance and Governance Project.245 The cooperative agreement for these efforts could be 
expanded to facilitate national policies for NFP function and IHR core capacities in 
partner states. 
E. SUMMARY 
New agencies and organizations do not have to be created to address global IHR 
compliance. Instead, by pairing the identified programs of excellence with WHO member 
                                                 
245 USAID, Users Guide to USAID, 24, 143. 
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states’ needs, the U.S. can greatly assist in development for surveillance, laboratory, and 
response core capacities. For the IHR core capacities most deficient, a pathway forward 
has been laid out to address the shortcomings in human resources, preparedness, and 
national legislation. Additionally, most U.S. global health programs appear to have cross-
cutting efforts that align with IHR core capacities. Public health officials must leverage 
these efforts to achieve the greatest value for money spent.   
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